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ABSTRACT 
 
Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1995–2008, we provide strong and robust evidence 
that corporate tax avoidance is positively associated with firm-specific stock price crash risk. This 
finding is consistent with the following view: Tax avoidance facilitates managerial rent extraction 
and bad news hoarding activities for extended periods by providing tools, masks, and justifications 
for these opportunistic behaviors. The hoarding and accumulation of bad news for extended periods 
lead to stock price crashes when the accumulated hidden bad news crosses a tipping point, and thus 
comes out all at once. Moreover, we show that the positive relation between tax avoidance and crash 
risk is attenuated when firms have strong external monitoring mechanisms such as high institutional 
ownership, high analyst coverage, and greater takeover threat from corporate control markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Traditional theory views tax avoidance as a value-maximizing activity that transfers wealth 
from the state to corporate shareholders. However, this view overlooks an important feature of 
modern corporations: the separation of ownership and control (Chen and Chu, 2005; Crocker and 
Slemrod, 2005; Slemrod, 2004). In an agency theory framework, recent research argues that tax 
avoidance activities can facilitate managerial opportunism, such as earnings manipulation and 
outright resource diversion (Chen et al., 2010; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006, 2009a). This paper 
explores the association between the extent of a firm’s tax avoidance and its future stock price crash 
risk. 
Our investigation is motivated by the aforementioned agency perspective of tax avoidance, as 
well as recent academic efforts to forecast extreme outcomes in the capital market. A wide range of 
incentives, such as compensation contracts, career concerns, and empire building, motivate managers 
to conceal adverse operating outcomes (Ball, 2009; Kothari et al., 2009). If a firm’s manager 
withholds and accumulates negative information for an extended period, the firm’s share price will 
be severely overvalued, thereby creating a bubble. When the accumulated negative information 
reaches a tipping point, it will be suddenly released to the stock market, all at once, resulting in the 
bubble bursting and a stock price crash (Hutton et al., 2009; Jin and Myers, 2006). More importantly, 
hiding negative information about a firm prevents investors and the board of directors from taking 
timely corrective actions or liquidating bad projects early. As a result, unprofitable projects are kept 
alive for too long and their poor performance accumulates over time, until an asset price crash occurs 
(Bleck and Liu, 2007). Consistent with these conjectures, recent research shows that the lack of 
information transparency increases future crash risk by enabling managers to hide and accumulate 
bad news (Hutton et al., 2009; Jin and Myers, 2006; Kim and Zhang, 2010). 
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Tax avoidance activities can create opportunities for managers to pursue activities that are 
designed to hide bad news and mislead investors (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). For example, 
complex tax shelters, such as Enron’s Project Steele, allow managers to manufacture earnings while 
preventing investors from understanding the sources (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009b). Perhaps more 
importantly, managers are able to justify the opacity of tax avoidance transactions by claiming that 
complexity and obfuscation are necessary to minimize the risk of tax avoidance arrangements being 
detected by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). To some extent, these avoidance activities are 
shielded from the investigations of audit committees and external auditors. Simply put, under the 
ostensible objective of reducing a firm’s tax obligations, managers can manipulate earnings and 
conceal negative firm-specific information using tax planning technologies. Moreover, complex and 
opaque tax avoidance transactions can also increase the latitude for other means of rent diversion and 
earnings manipulation. For instance, the complexity created by Tyco’s tax avoidance arrangements 
facilitated the centralization of power by the then-CEO Dennis Kozlowski and CFO Mark Swartz, 
and enabled them to obscure their rent-diverting activities through means such as unauthorized 
compensation, abuse of corporate funds for personal purposes, and insider trading for an extended 
period, from 1997 to 2002 (Desai, 2005).  
Building on the above arguments and evidence, we conjecture that tax avoidance activities 
facilitate managerial rent diversion and bad news hoarding behaviors for an extended period, which 
increases the probability of future stock price crashes. This conjecture is also supported by anecdotal 
evidence from Enron’s demise, as well as from other high-profile corporate scandals such as Dynegy, 
Tyco, and Xerox (Desai, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Graham and Tucker, 2006; Slemrod, 
2004).1 For example, the final revelation of the tax shelters employed by Dynegy from September 
                                                 
1 Desai (2005) and Desai and Dharmapala (2006), among others, provide excellent analyses of these cases in the 
context of tax sheltering and earnings manipulation. 
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2000 to April 2002 resulted in a loss of 97% of its market value (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006).2 This 
study seeks to provide large-sample evidence on the relation between tax avoidance and crash risk. 
To examine the firm-level relation between tax avoidance and future crash risk, we construct 
multiple measures of firm-specific crash risk and tax avoidance. Following Chen et al. (2001) and 
Hutton et al. (2009), we measure firm-specific crash risk using two proxies: (i) the likelihood of the 
occurrence of future negative, extreme firm-specific weekly returns and (ii) the negative skewness of 
future firm-specific weekly returns. Tax avoidance activities are proxied by (i) the estimated 
probability of engaging in tax shelters (SHELTER) based on Wilson’s (2009) tax sheltering 
prediction model, (ii) the long-run cash effective tax rate (LRETR) developed by Dyreng et al. (2008), 
and (iii) a common factor (BTDFACTOR) extracted from three book-tax difference measures.3 
Higher estimated sheltering probabilities, lower long-run cash effective tax rates, and larger book-tax 
differences are consistent with greater levels of tax avoidance. 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2009) state, “If tax avoidance represents a continuum of tax planning 
strategies where something like municipal bond investments are at one end, then terms such as 
‘noncompliance,’ ‘evasion,’ ‘aggressiveness,’ and ‘sheltering’ would be closer to the other end of the 
continuum.” According to this classification, our story is closer to the aggressiveness and sheltering 
end of the continuum. Accordingly, we argue that the SHELTER measure should be the most suitable 
measure for our research question. In contrast, the LRETR measure can reflect all tax planning 
activities, which captures the entire spectrum of tax avoidance. Nevertheless, we use this measure for 
two main reasons. First, a very low level of LRETR likely captures extreme cases of tax sheltering 
activities such as Enron’s. As discussed in the next section, Enron paid zero tax during the four-year 
                                                 
2 Basically, the tax shelters of Dynegy were able to manufacture a large magnitude of operating cash flows, which 
were essentially disguised loans for the firm.   
3 These three book-tax difference measures are the total book-tax difference, the ETR differential, and the Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) residual book-tax difference. Please refer to Appendix C for details on the construction of the 
common factor.   
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period of 1996–1999. Second, since rent diversion is likely long run in nature and it is the hoarding 
of bad news for an extended period that leads to crashes, LRETR also should be a necessary measure 
for our research question. Finally, book-tax differences can be affected by many things besides tax 
avoidance, and thus it should be the least appropriate measure for our purpose, and we include it 
simply for completeness and the readers’ full information. 
Using a large sample of U.S. public firms for the period 1995–2008, we find that firms with 
higher sheltering probabilities, lower long-run cash effective tax rates, and larger book-tax 
differences are more likely to experience firm-specific stock price crashes in the future. For instance, 
we find that the marginal effects of SHELTER, LRETR, and BTDFACTOR are 3.6%, -4.1%, and 
3.1%, respectively, in logistic regressions of crash occurrences in year t on tax avoidance measures in 
year t - 1 (with the full set of control variables).4 Moreover, we find that the tax avoidance measures 
can predict crash risk as far as three years into the future. These results are consistent with our 
conjecture that tax avoidance activities enable managers to hide and accumulate bad news within the 
firm, which, in turn, increases future crash risk. The association between tax avoidance and future 
crash risk is incrementally significant, even after controlling for Hutton et al.’s (2009) measure for 
accrual manipulation, Chen et al.’s (2001) investor heterogeneity, and many other determinants 
known to influence the occurrence of negative return outliers. 
After establishing a positive relation between tax avoidance and firm-specific crash risk, we 
further examine whether this relation varies with the quality of external monitoring mechanisms. 
This additional empirical exercise is motivated by recent studies on the economic consequences of 
tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009a; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). These studies provide 
evidence suggesting that the impact of tax avoidance activities on investor welfare depends on the 
strength of a firm’s monitoring mechanisms. Using the level of analyst coverage, institutional 
                                                 
4 The unconditional probability of crash in our sample is 16.1%. 
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ownership, and shareholder rights as proxies for the strength of external monitoring, we find that the 
positive relation between tax avoidance and future crash risk is diminished for firms with stronger 
external monitoring. This evidence adds more credence to the agency theory explanations for the 
positive relation observed between tax avoidance and crash risk. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, to our knowledge, this is the 
first study to document a significant positive relation between tax avoidance and future crash risk, 
which adds to the recent stream of research on the economic consequences of corporate tax 
avoidance. Closely related studies include Desai and Dharmapala (2009a) and Hanlon and Slemrod 
(2009), which provide somewhat mixed evidence on the economic implications of tax avoidance 
activities.5 Specifically, Desai and Dharmapala (2009a) find no relation between abnormal book-tax 
difference and firm value on average, and a positive relation between the two for a subsample of 
firms with high institutional ownership. On the other hand, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find a 
negative market reaction to news about a firm’s involvement in tax shelters, although the negative 
reaction is less pronounced for well-governed firms. 
This paper, instead of relying on investors’ current perceptions of tax avoidance activities and 
exploring the “mean-pricing” effects, investigates the implication of tax avoidance for future extreme 
returns (i.e., higher-moment effects). Extreme outcomes can have an extraordinary cumulative effect 
that can provide valuable insights into the true nature of a phenomenon (Taleb, 2007).6 Therefore, we 
believe that our empirical evidence is unique and useful to the understanding of the underlying 
                                                 
5 See Hanlon and Heitzman (2009) for a comprehensive review of the recent literature on tax avoidance. 
6 For example, when corporate insiders withhold bad news, the lack of transparency can have a negative impact on 
stock returns (mean effect) and an increase in return volatility (variance effect). As noted by Jin and Myers (2006), 
however, it is the hidden bad news accumulated over time beyond a certain level that increases the frequency of 
extreme negative returns, crashes, or the left skewness of return distributions (third-moment effect). One can 
therefore learn more about the economic implications of certain policies or behaviors by examining extreme return 
outcomes. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence (e.g., the recent financial crisis of 2008–2009) shows that economic 
actors, though rational on average, have a tendency to take corrective action only after they encounter extreme 
(negative) outcomes.      
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motivation and ultimate consequence of corporate tax avoidance activities. However, it is important 
to note that it is not tax avoidance per se but, rather, the rent diversion and bad news hoarding 
associated therewith that cause stock price crashes. For example, tax sheltering, that is, the most 
aggressive and complex form of tax avoidance strategies, provides self-interested managers with 
means, masks, and justifications to withhold bad news and/or divert corporate resources, which 
eventually leads to stock price crashes. Our findings reinforce the agency perspective of corporate tax 
avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Desai and Dharmapala, 2009b; Desai et al., 2007) and 
identify the significant cost that tax avoidance can impose on firms and their shareholders. 
Second, our research extends the emerging literature of forecasting future stock price crash 
risk. This literature has received much attention from both the investment community and academic 
researchers since the recent stock market debacles of 2001–2002 and 2008–2009. This paper 
provides new evidence that several publicly available measures of tax avoidance have an incremental 
ability to predict future firm-specific crash risk, over and above other predictors identified by 
previous research. Recent empirical evidence from both the equity and option markets is consistent 
with occasional observations that extreme outcomes in the stock market significantly impact investor 
welfare, and that investors are greatly concerned about the probability of these extreme outcomes 
(Pan, 2002; Yan, 2010). Moreover, Sunder (2010) argues that, unlike the risks stemming from 
symmetric volatilities, the risk of (extreme) losses cannot be reduced through diversification, but 
only through screening.7  In this sense, our study contributes to the literature by providing one 
potential screening technology. Finally, our findings lend further empirical support to the bad news 
hoarding theory of stock price crashes (Bleck and Liu, 2007; Jin and Myers, 2006). 
                                                 
7 In his presentation, Sunder (2010) argues that understanding the differences between these two concepts of risk is 
one of the “six root accounting issues.” 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
and presents our central predictions. Section 3 describes our sample and research design. Sections 4 
and 5 discuss the empirical results. Section 6 presents our conclusions. 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2009) broadly define tax avoidance as “the reduction of explicit taxes 
per dollar of pre-tax accounting earnings or cash flows.” The literature has been holding the view that 
positive book-tax differences (i.e., the differences between incomes reported to the capital market 
and tax authorities) and low effective tax rates reflect tax avoidance behavior. Accordingly, the 
growing book-tax differences and declining effective tax rates for U.S. public corporations since the 
mid-1990s have stimulated researchers to investigate the determinants and consequences of corporate 
tax avoidance activities (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009b; Graham, 2003; Shackelford and Shevlin, 
2001). 
Generally, two alternative views underlie empirical research on tax avoidance. One is that 
managers undertake tax avoidance activities for the sole purpose of reducing corporate tax 
obligations. Thus, from the investors’ perspective, tax avoidance is value enhancing, and managers 
should be motivated and compensated for engaging in such activities.8 An example of this view of 
tax avoidance is Phillips (2003), who finds that compensating business unit managers on an after-tax 
basis lowers a firm’s effective tax rates. Although this view also recognizes the potential costs of tax 
avoidance, the costs considered mainly include direct costs, such as managers’ time and the potential 
risk of detection by tax authorities. 
The other view of tax avoidance incorporates more dimensions of the agency tension 
between managers and investors. In addition to shirking, this so-called agency perspective of tax 
                                                 
8 According to this view, the problem that needs to be solved by investors is simply managerial shirking.  
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avoidance also considers another form of the agency problem: managerial opportunism or resource 
diversion (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009b). Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that complex tax 
avoidance transactions can provide management with the tools, masks, and justifications for 
opportunistic managerial behaviors, such as earnings manipulations, related party transactions, and 
other resource-diverting activities. In other words, tax avoidance and managerial diversion can be 
complementary. Using a case analysis, Desai (2005) provides detailed evidence on how these 
opportunistic managerial behaviors can be facilitated by tax avoidance. This agency view of tax 
avoidance is attracting increasing attention in the literature (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2009). For 
example, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) show that strengthened equity incentives actually decrease 
tax avoidance for firms with weaker governance, consistent with the view that tax avoidance 
facilitates managerial diversion. Chen et al. (2010) find that family firms are less tax aggressive than 
their non-family counterparts. The authors conclude that family owners appear to forgo tax benefits 
to avoid the non-tax cost of a potential price discount arising from minority shareholders’ concern 
about family rent seeking masked by tax avoidance activities. 
The literature has also begun examining the stock market consequences of tax avoidance 
activities under the agency perspective. Desai and Dharmapala (2009a) find no relation between tax 
avoidance and firm value; however, they do find a positive relation between the two for firms with 
high institutional ownership. Their finding suggests that tax avoidance has a net benefit in an 
environment in which monitoring and control effectively constrain managerial opportunism afforded 
by tax avoidance activities. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) examine the market reaction to news about a 
firm’s involvement in tax shelters. The authors find a negative market reaction to tax shelter 
disclosure, suggesting that investors are concerned about the possibility that tax shelters are 
intertwined with managerial diversion and performance manipulation. Furthermore, the authors find 
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that the negative reaction is less pronounced for firms with stronger governance; however, this result 
seems to be sensitive to how governance is empirically measured. 
Our study seeks to extend the line of research that examines the consequences of tax 
avoidance under the agency perspective. Motivated by recent theories that the managerial tendency 
to conceal bad news engenders stock price crashes (Hutton et al., 2009; Jin and Myers, 2006), we 
investigate the relation between tax avoidance and crash risk. Kothari et al. (2009) argue that career 
concerns motivate managers to withhold bad news and overstate financial performance. The authors 
define career concerns broadly, as including the impact of disclosure on current monetary incentives 
such as bonus plans and stock/option-based incentives, as well as the long-horizon effects of 
disclosures on promotion, employment opportunities, and potential termination. In addition, Ball 
(2001, 2009) argues that nonfinancial motives, such as empire building and maintaining the esteem 
of one’s peers, also provide powerful incentives for managers to conceal bad performance. 
Empirically, Kothari et al. (2009) find evidence consistent with the tendency of managers to hoard 
bad news. 
The managerial tendency to withhold bad news leads to bad news being stockpiled within the 
firm. However, there is a certain point at which it becomes too costly or impossible for managers to 
withhold the bad news (Kothari et al., 2009). When such a tipping point arrives, all the hitherto 
hidden bad news will come out at once, resulting in a large negative price adjustment, that is, a crash 
(Hutton et al., 2009; Jin and Myers, 2006). Moreover, Bleck and Liu (2007) argue that the 
withholding of bad news prevents investors from discerning bad projects from good ones and, 
therefore, from liquidating bad projects promptly. Thus, bad projects are kept alive and the resulting 
negative cash flows eventually materialize, triggering asset price crashes. Employing country- and 
firm-level designs, respectively, Jin and Myers (2006) and Hutton et al.. (2009) provide empirical 
evidence consistent with the above mechanisms of stock price crashes. 
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This paper argues that tax avoidance is positively related to crash risk because it can provide 
masks and tools for managers to withhold bad news and overstate financial performance. This line of 
reasoning can appear counterintuitive, since tax avoidance requires managers to downplay income 
reported to tax authorities. However, the different treatments of tax planning transactions under tax 
and financial reporting, combined with the complexity and obfuscation of those transactions, allow 
managers to hide bad news from outside investors under the pretense of minimizing corporate tax 
obligations. 
Following Desai (2005) and Desai and Dharmapala (2006), we use the Enron case to 
illustrate how complex structured transactions originated from tax planning can be used to 
manipulate financial reporting outcomes because of the book-tax nonconformity.9 During the second 
half of the 1990s, Enron’s management was motivated to find ways to increase reported earnings and 
thereby drive up the firm’s stock price. The ambition to succeed in the stock market may have 
stemmed from the large portfolios of stocks and options held by the management and the associated 
incentives, or, in Ball’s (2009) view, from management’s desire to be celebrities. As a result of 
managerial aggressiveness, the reported picture of the company failed to comport with the underlying 
economic reality, and Enron notoriously collapsed in the end. 
The Joint Committee of Taxation (JCT) report of the U.S. Congress (2003) reveals a pattern 
of behavior showing that Enron deliberately and aggressively engaged in transactions that had little 
or no business purpose to obtain favorable tax and accounting treatments: 
As Enron’s management realized that tax-motivated transactions could generate financial 
accounting benefits, Enron looked to its tax department to devise transactions that increase 
financial accounting income. In effect, the tax department was converted into an Enron 
                                                 
9 Information sources for the Enron case include Palepu and Healy (2003), US. Congress (2003), and Desai (2005).   
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business unit, complete with annual revenue targets. The tax department, in consultation with 
outside experts, then designed transactions to meet or approximate the technical requirements 
of tax provisions with the primary purpose of manufacturing financial statement income. The 
slogan “Show Me the Money!” exemplified this effort. (p. 21) 
From 1995 until its demise, Enron used tax-planning techniques by engaging in 12 large 
structured transactions for the primary purpose of achieving financial accounting benefits rather than 
federal income tax benefits. The design of many of these transactions permitted Enron to 
immediately report the financial accounting benefits of a transaction, even though the federal income 
tax benefits would not occur until significantly into the future. Appendix A provides a summary of 
the 12 structured transactions. 
For example, Project Tanya allowed Enron to report a short-term capital loss of 
$188.515 million on its 1995 return. It also enabled Enron to deduct a total of $76.68 million in 
connection with assumed liabilities in its 1996–2000 tax returns. However, this $188.515 million loss 
reported on Enron’s tax return did not result in a corresponding loss for financial statement purposes. 
On the contrary, the tax savings associated with the loss resulted in an increase in financial statement 
earnings of $65.8 million, through a reduction in the provision for income tax expenses. Enron 
booked $46.5 million of these earnings in 1995 and another $19.3 million in 1999. The JCT report 
provides a detailed description for Project Tanya’s complicated implementation process.10 With the 
help of tax shelters such as Project Tanya, Enron was able to simultaneously maintain a stream of 
negative taxable incomes and report an amazing growth streak in accounting earnings during the 
period 1996–1999. As a result, Enron’s stock price soared during the same period, until it collapsed 
in 2001. 
                                                 
10 The transaction package involved in Project Tanya was known as the “contingent liability tax shelter.” 
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The case of Enron offers a stylized example of how managers, by engaging in complex tax 
avoidance activities, manufacture earnings and conceal the true performance of a firm, which creates 
stock price bubbles and eventually results in stock price crashes. In addition to facilitating bad news 
hoarding, complex tax avoidance strategies can afford opportunities for managerial straightforward 
resource diversion, which can also increase stock price crash risk. Tyco is an example of how the 
complexity and obfuscation of tax avoidance activities provide managers with shields for outright 
resource diversion for an extended period of time. 
In 1997, through a reverse merger with ADT, a Bermuda-based securities service firm, Tyco 
was able to stop paying U.S. taxes on its non-U.S. income. Tyco then shifted pre-tax profits from 
countries with high tax rates to its many tax haven subsidiaries, through complex techniques such as 
transfer pricing. As a result, Tyco was able to cut its effective tax rate from 36% in 1996 to 23% in 
2001. During the same period, managerial looting of the firm emerged and accelerated over time. 
The various types of diversion activities include the expropriation of corporate funds for personal 
purposes, the abuse of loan programs, unauthorized compensation, related party transactions, and 
insider trading (Desai, 2005). 
Desai (2005) provides a detailed and excellent discussion of how active tax management 
strategies helped managers diverting funds in Tyco, briefly summarized here. 
(i) The complex nature of Tyco’s tax avoidance strategies made its operations extremely 
opaque. The management took advantage of this opaqueness to hide their fund-diverting 
transactions. 
(ii) The ability to manufacture post-tax profits through profit shifting to tax haven 
subsidiaries obscured true profitability and allowed Tyco’s management to divert funds 
without damaging the reported operating performance. 
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(iii) The same tax haven subsidiaries that shielded Tyco’s profits facilitated managerial 
concealment of insider trading, because of the bank secrecy policies in these jurisdictions. 
The revelation of Tyco managers’ extensive resource diversions during 1997–2002 caused its stock 
price to drop from about $95 in early 2002 to $14 in the middle of 2002. 
This study intends to provide systematic evidence on the relation between tax avoidance and 
crash risk. Specifically, it tests the following hypothesis in alternative form. 
H1: All else being equal, tax avoidance is positively associated with future stock price crash 
risk. 
The prediction of the positive relation between tax avoidance and future crash risk is based 
on the agency tension between shareholders and managers, which gives rise to managerial 
opportunism. Thus, the impact of tax avoidance on crash risk should be mitigated for firms with 
better governance and monitoring. Following Desai and Dharmapala (2009a) and Hanlon and 
Slemrod (2009), we also examine the moderating role of external monitoring. 
H2: All else being equal, the positive association between tax avoidance and crash risk is 
attenuated when external monitoring is effective. 
Empirical results consistent with H2 corroborate the agency theory explanation for H1. That 
is, if the positive relation between tax avoidance and crash risk is not caused by managerial 
opportunism, we will not observe evidence consistent with H2. 
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3. Sample and Research Design 
3.1. Sample and Data Source 
The crash risk measures are constructed using the weekly return data of the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) from 1995 to 2008. Specifically, for each firm-year, we assign 
weekly returns to the 12-month period ending three months after the firm’s fiscal year-end. This 
definition of the sample year allows us to avoid a “look-ahead” bias by ensuring that the financial 
data are available to investors when forecasting crash risk. We then obtain lagged annual financial 
statement variables from Compustat. We start our sample period in 1995 (or the collection of tax 
information in 1994) because two regulatory events in 1993 likely affect the consistent measurement 
of our tax avoidance variables.11 First, FAS 109, Accounting for Income Taxes, was enacted, which 
changed the accounting for income taxes. Also, the statutory corporate income tax rate increased 
from 34% to 35%. 
We further exclude observations with non-positive book values and total assets, observations 
with fiscal year-end prices of less than $1, and observations with fewer than 26 weeks of stock return 
data. After applying this minimum data filtering, we are left with a sample of 87,162 firm–year 
observations for the period 1995–2008. Our crash risk measures are estimated based on this initial 
sample of firm-years. In our later regression analysis, the sample size varies, depending on the 
availability of tax avoidance measures and control variables. Table 1 presents the yearly distribution 
for this initial sample. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
                                                 
11 We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this point. 
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3.2. Measuring Firm-Specific Crash Risk 
To calculate the measures of firm-specific crash risk, we first estimate firm-specific weekly 
returns for each firm and year. Specifically, the firm-specific weekly return, denoted by W, is defined 
as the natural log of one plus the residual return from the expanded market model regression 
 
         τττττττ εβββββα jmjmjmjmjmjjj rrrrrr ++++++= ++−− 2,51,4,31,22,1, ,                  (1) 
 
where τ,jr  is the return on stock j in week τ  and τ,mr  is the return on the CRSP value-weighted 
market index in week τ . We include the lead and lag terms for the market index return to allow for 
nonsynchronous trading (Dimson, 1979). The firm-specific weekly return for firm j in week τ , τ,jW , 
is measured by the natural log of one plus the residual return in Eq. (1), that is, )1ln( ., ττ ε jjW += . 
We define crash weeks in a given fiscal year for a given firm as those weeks during which 
the firm experiences firm-specific weekly returns 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-
specific weekly returns over the entire fiscal year, with 3.2 chosen to generate a frequency of 0.1% in 
the normal distribution. Following Hutton et al. (2009), our first measure of crash likelihood for each 
firm in each year, denoted by CRASH, is an indicator variable that equals one for a firm–year that 
experiences one or more crash weeks (as defined above) during the fiscal year period, and zero 
otherwise. As shown in the last column of Table 1, on average, 16.3% of firms in our sample 
experienced at least one crash event during a given year.12 Although the percentage of firms with 
crashes does not exhibit any clear trend over time, we observe that it is highest (27.2%) in 2008, 
reflecting the recent financial crisis of 2008–2009. 
                                                 
12 Assuming a normal distribution of firm-specific weekly returns, our definition of crash should lead us to observe 
about a 5% crash probability during a given year; however, we observe considerably higher probabilities of crashes 
than this benchmark. This is not surprising, because we do not expect the firm-specific weekly return to be normally 
distributed. Following Hutton et al. (2009) and others, we merely use the 0.1% cutoff of the normal distribution as a 
convenient way of obtaining reasonable benchmarks for extreme events. 
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 Our second measure of crash risk is the negative conditional return skewness (NCSKEW) 
measure of Chen et al. (2001). Specifically, we calculate NCSKEW for a given firm in a fiscal year 
by taking the negative of the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns for each sample year and 
dividing it by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power. 
Specifically, for each firm j in year t, we compute NCSKEW as 
 
         
[ ] ( )[ ]232323 )2)(1()1( ∑∑ −−−−= ττ jjjt WnnWnnNCSKEW ,                                   (2) 
 
3.3. Measuring Tax Avoidance 
 Hanlon and Heitzman (2009) recommend that researchers carefully consider the 
appropriateness of tax avoidance measures for the research question at hand. Our theory is related to 
some complicated tax avoidance transactions that are structured specifically to conceal bad news and 
accomplish rent diversion, or that can help managers camouflage the use of some other means of bad 
news hoarding and rent diversion. Thus, an ideal measure of tax avoidance for our purpose should be 
able to capture the most aggressive and complex tax sheltering activities. Bearing this in mind, we 
choose Wilson’s (2009) predicted probability of engaging in tax shelters as our first main measure of 
tax avoidance. This measure focuses primarily on a firm’s tendency of undertaking an extreme form 
of tax avoidance, which is likely the most suitable measure for our research question.13 Specially, we 
define SHELTER as the predicted value from the equation 
SHELTER = -4.86 + 5.20 × BTD + 4.08 × |DAP| - 1.41 × LEV + 0.76 × AT 
                 + 3.51 × ROE + 1.72 × FOREIGN INCOME + 2.43 × R&D,                                (3) 
                                                 
13 Hanlon and Heitzman (2009) argue, “Firms that can otherwise avoid taxes may not need to engage in shelters, and 
firms that for whatever reason cannot otherwise avoid taxes may be the ones that engage in tax shelters.” Thus, the 
use of shelters can be endogenous. However, in this paper, our theory is more about firms that employ complex and 
opaque tax shelters, but not necessarily firms that avoid the most taxes; therefore this concern should be less 
important in our setting. 
17 
 
 
where BTD is the total book-tax difference; |DAP| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals from 
the performance-adjusted modified cross-sectional Jones model; LEV is long-term debt divided by 
total assets; AT is the log of total assets; ROE is pre-tax earnings divided by total assets; FOREIGN 
INCOME is an indicator variable set equal to one for firm-years that report foreign income, and zero 
otherwise; and R&D is research and development expenses divided by lagged total assets. According 
to Wilson (2009), a higher value of SHELTER is consistent with a greater level of tax avoidance. The 
Wilson model predicts the likelihood that a firm is currently engaging in tax sheltering activities. 
Lisowsky (2010) extends Wilson’s (2009) sheltering model by including more predictors. 
The author also estimates the coefficients of the predictors for both the original and expanded Wilson 
(2009) models, using confidential tax shelter and tax return data from the IRS. Unfortunately, 
however, we are not able to estimate the sheltering probability measure using Lisowsky’s (2010) 
expanded model, because we do not have the tax haven information for the firms’ subsidiaries, a key 
input in Lisowsky’s model.14 For robustness tests, we compute an alternative measure of sheltering 
probability, using Lisowsky’s (2010) estimated coefficients for the Wilson (2009) model based on 
the confidential tax shelter data. Although not tabulated here, all empirical results using this 
alternative measure are similar to those reported in this paper. 
Our ability to make inferences based on the first tax avoidance measure is, of course, limited 
by the extent to which the sheltering models capture the profile of tax sheltering participants. 
Therefore, we also employ a second measure, the long-run cash effective tax rate (LRETR), 
developed by Dyreng et al. (2008)15: 
                                                 
14 Subsidiary tax haven information for a firm’s subsidiaries needs to be manually collected from the 10-K Schedule 
21, which is a nontrivial task given our large sample size. 
15 The results are qualitatively the same if we do not adjust for special items. 
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According to Dyreng et al., measuring effective taxes using cash taxes paid rather than GAAP tax 
expenses has at least two advantages. First, cash effective tax rates take into account the tax benefits 
of employee stock options, whereas GAAP effective tax rates do not. Second, cash effective tax rates 
are not affected by changes in accounting estimates such as the valuation allowance or tax 
contingency reserve. In addition, measuring cash effective tax rates over long horizons achieves 
better matching between taxes paid and the income to which these taxes relate. 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2009) argue that an additional benefit of the LRETR measure is that it 
has the potential to identify firms successful at avoiding taxes in the long run. This feature is useful 
for our study because rent diversion is likely long run in nature and it is the hoarding of bad news for 
an extended period that leads to crashes. Moreover, because we cannot identify all firms that engage 
in tax shelters per se, LRETR also is a necessary measure for our purpose. Nonetheless, we 
acknowledge that this measure can capture all tax planning transactions (including municipal bond 
investments), whereas our story is more consistent with the more aggressive end of the tax avoidance 
spectrum (e.g., tax sheltering). 
We use a measurement period of five years to alleviate concern about potential survivorship 
bias associated with the use of horizons longer than five years.16 In addition, we require at least three 
consecutive years of non-missing data for the LRETR measure. Thus, the LRETR sample includes 
three-, four-, and five-year long-term cash effective tax rates.17 Note that a lower LRETR is consistent 
                                                 
16 Dyreng et al. (2008) use measurement windows of one, five, and 10 years.  
17 The empirical results are all very similar if we require five years of non-missing data for the LRETR measure. 
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with higher tax avoidance. For example, as discussed in our case analysis, Enron paid zero tax during 
1996–1999, reflecting its engagement in extremely aggressive tax avoidance activities. 
Many prior studies also use a variety of book-tax difference measures for tax avoidance, 
where book-tax difference is defined as the difference between income reported to the capital market 
and that reported to the tax authorities. Mills (1998) finds that firms with large book-tax differences 
are more likely to have IRS audits and larger proposed audit adjustments, which can suggest that 
book-tax differences capture some element of tax avoidance. However, large book-tax differences 
can also be indicative of accrual manipulation (or a combination of tax avoidance and accrual 
manipulation), or be a simple reflection of differences in financial and tax accounting rules. Thus, 
book-tax difference measures are likely to be less appropriate for our research question. Nonetheless, 
we include them for completeness as well as the robustness of our results. 
Instead of examining each individual book-tax difference measure, we use factor analysis to 
extract one common factor (BTDFACTOR) from the following three book-tax difference measures 
commonly used in the literature18:  
(i) The total book-tax difference, which equals pre-tax book income less estimated taxable 
income. Wilson (2009) finds that total book-tax differences are larger for firms accused of 
engaging in tax shelters than for a matched sample of non-accused firms. 
(ii) The ETR differential, which equals the total book-tax difference less the temporary book-
tax difference. This measure is intended to pick up the permanent component of book-tax 
                                                 
18 Other papers that use factor analysis to measure tax aggressiveness include Chen et al. (2010) and Lennox et al. 
(2010). The common factor extracted from factor analysis provides a concise measure of book-tax difference and 
also captures a firm’s “underlying” tendency of avoiding taxes. In addition, the book-tax difference factor extracts 
information from multiple book-tax difference measures and therefore could be advantageous over any individual 
such measure. Appendix C provides more detailed descriptions of the three book-tax difference measures used in the 
factor analysis. The eigenvalue of this factor is 1.961, whereas the other factors have eigenvalues of less than 0.355. 
The correlations between the book-tax difference factor and the three variables are 0.822 (total book-tax difference), 
0.027 (ETR differential), and 0.147 (Desai and Dharmapala’s 2006 residual book-tax difference). 
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difference, even though it captures more than permanent book-tax difference (Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2009). Some prior research claims that permanent differences reflect aggressive 
tax sheltering. However, this claim is not well supported by empirical data (Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2009). We include this measure mainly because it is less likely to be affected by 
pre-tax accrual management. 
(iii) Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) residual book-tax difference, which equals the residual 
from a firm fixed-effect regression of the total book-tax difference on total accruals measured 
using the cash flow statement method (Hribar and Collins, 2002). Since the total book-tax 
difference can reflect tax avoidance and accrual management, this measure intends to isolate 
the component of the estimated book-tax difference that is not explained by accruals or 
abnormal accruals. Appendixes B and C offer more detailed definitions for these measures. 
Two other popular book-tax difference measures in the literature are Manzon and Plesko’s 
(2002) book-tax differences and Frank et al.’s (2009) so-called discretionary permanent book-tax 
difference (DTAX). We exclude Manzon and Plesko’s (2002) measure because it is based on U.S. 
numbers only and is not the focus of our paper. We do not use the DTAX measure because it is 
potentially problematic, given the lack of good structural models of book-tax differences (Hanlon 
and Heitzman, 2009).19 Moreover, using a large sample of tax shelters from the IRS during the period 
2000–2004, Lisowsky (2010) and Lisowsky et al. (2009) do not find a reliably positive relation 
between the DTAX measure and incidence of tax shelters.20 
                                                 
19 See Hanlon and Heitzman (2009) for more detailed discussions on the problems inherent in the DTAX measure. 
Though not reported, we find similar results when we include the DTAX measure in constructing BTDFACTOR.   
20 Frank et al. (2009) find a significantly positive association between the DTAX measure and their measure of 
earnings management. However, in this study, we are unable to find a similar positive correlation between DTAX 
and our three measures of earnings management. 
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3.4. Research Design 
To test H1, we estimate the following two regressions that link our measures of crash risk in 
year t to our proxies for tax avoidance in year t - 1 and to a set of control variables in year t - 1: 
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where CRASHt is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm experiences one or more crash events 
in year t, and zero otherwise; NCSKEWt is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns; and 
TAXVARt-1 is one of the three tax avoidance metrics discussed in Section 3.3, measured in year t - 1. 
Equation (5) is estimated using logistic regressions, while Eq. (6) is estimated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions. Hypothesis H1 predicts a positive coefficient for SHELTERt-1, a negative 
coefficient for LRETRt-1, and a positive coefficient forBTDFACTORt-1. 
The set of control variables includes DTURNt-1, NCSKEWt-1, SIGMAt-1, RETt-1, SIZEt-1, MBt-1, 
LEVt-1, ROAt-1, and ACCMt-1, which are taken from Chen et al. (2001) and Hutton et al. (2009). The 
variable DTURNt-1 is the detrended average monthly stock turnover in year t - 1. This is Chen et al.’s 
(2001) key variable of interest, a proxy for differences of opinion among investors. The authors find 
this detrended turnover variable to be positively related to future crash risk. The variable NCSKEWt-1 
is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns in year t - 1. They find that firms with high 
return skewness in year t - 1 are likely to have high return skewness in year t as well. The variable 
SIGMAt-1 is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period t - 1. 
More volatile stocks are more likely to experience stock price crashes in the future (Chen et al., 
2001). The variable RETt-1 is defined as the arithmetic average of firm-specific weekly returns in year 
t - 1. The authors also document that stocks with high past returns are more likely to crash. The 
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variable SIZEt-1 is defined as the log of the market value of equity in year t - 1. Both Chen et al. 
(2001) and Hutton et al. (2009) report a positive relation between size and crash risk. The variable 
MBt-1 is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in year t - 1. Both groups of 
authors show that growth stocks are more likely to experience future price crashes. The variable 
LEVt-1 is the total long-term debt divided by total assets. The variable ROAt-1 is defined as income 
before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. Hutton et al. (2009) show that financial 
leverage and operating performance are both negatively related to crash risk. 
The variable ACCMt-1 is Hutton et al.’s (2009) measure of accrual manipulation, which is 
measured by a three-year moving sum of absolute discretionary accruals. This is the key variable of 
interest for these authors, who find a positive relation between ACCM and crash risk. This variable is 
also the most important control variable in our analysis, especially in the regressions with the book-
tax difference measure as the tax avoidance proxy. This is because book-tax differences are likely to 
be affected by both pre-tax accrual management and tax avoidance activities. Some previous studies 
even employ book-tax differences as an indicator of accrual quality (Hanlon, 2005; Lev and Nissim, 
2004).21 Note, however, that accrual manipulation is also part of our story: Tax avoidance activities 
can facilitate accrual management, which increases crash risk. Thus, we conservatively control for 
ACCM in an effort to isolate the direct effect of tax avoidance from the indirect effect through its 
impact on accrual manipulation. In our later discussion of empirical results and robustness tests, we 
elaborate on the relations between tax avoidance, earnings management, and crash risk. Finally, year 
dummies are included in both Eqs. (5) and (6) to control for year fixed effects. Appendix B provides 
more detailed definitions for these control variables. 
To test H2, we augment Eqs. (5) and (6) with external monitoring variables and their 
interactions with tax avoidance variables as follows: 
                                                 
21 These authors use taxable income as a benchmark of “true earnings.” 
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where MONt-1 refers to a proxy for the effectiveness of external monitoring. We consider three 
proxies for external monitoring mechanisms: ANALt-1, INSTt-1, and HIGt-1. The variable ANALt-1 is the 
log of one plus the number of analysts following.22 Previous research suggests that financial analysts 
play an external monitoring role. For example, Yu (2008) finds that firms with high analyst coverage 
engage less in opportunistic earnings management, a finding consistent with the monitoring role of 
analysts. The variable INSTt-1 is the level of institutional ownership. Institutional investors are more 
sophisticated than individual investors and act as external monitors of the firm. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009a) find tax avoidance to be positively related to firm value for firms with higher 
institutional ownership, consistent with the view that institutional owners play an important 
governance role. Finally, the variable HIGt-1 is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a 
firm has an above-median GINDEX, and zero otherwise, where GINDEX is the number of anti-
takeover provisions for a firm. More anti-takeover provisions insulate a firm’s management from 
takeover threats from the corporate control market, indicating lower shareholder rights and thus 
weaker monitoring (Gompers et al., 2003). Desai and Dharmapala (2006) find that a better alignment 
of interest between shareholders and managers leads to less tax sheltering, but only for firms with 
HIG = 1 (weaker external monitoring). 
Hypothesis H2 predicts that the positive association between tax avoidance and crash risk is 
attenuated for firms with strong external monitoring. Thus, H2 should translate into (i) negative 
                                                 
22 We assign zero to analyst following if analyst following data are missing from I/B/E/S. 
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coefficients for TAXVAR × ANAL and TAXVAR × INST and positive coefficients for TAXVAR × HIG, 
when tax avoidance is proxied by SHELTER (or BTDFACTOR) and (ii) positive coefficients for 
TAXVAR × ANAL and TAXVAR × INST and negative coefficients for TAXVAR × HIG, when tax 
avoidance is measured by LRETR. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables used in the 
regression analyses, based on the sample of firm-years with non-missing control variables. As seen in 
Panel A of Table 2, the mean value of CRASH is 0.161, suggesting that 16.1% of firm–years 
experience at least one crash event.23 The average value of NCSKEW is -0.079, which is much larger 
than that reported by Chen et al. (2001), suggesting that the sample of firm-years in our study is more 
crash-prone than that of Chen et al. 24  The mean and median LRETR are 36.5% and 30.1%, 
respectively. More interestingly, the 25th percentile of LRETR is 19.1%, suggesting that 
approximately one-fourth of our sample firms are able to maintain a long-run cash effective tax rate 
below 20%. This result is similar to that of Dyreng et al. (2008), who employ a smaller sample than 
ours. 25 The distributions of other variables are largely consistent with those reported in prior studies. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows that the two crash risk measures (i.e., CRASHt and NCSKEWt) are 
highly correlated, with a ratio of 0.585. In addition, the correlations between the three tax avoidance 
                                                 
23 The percentage is slightly lower than the mean of the full sample, without restrictions from tax avoidance and 
control variables. 
24 The sample period of Chen et al. (2001) is 1962–1998. 
25 The mean and median five-year LRETR values in Dyreng et al. (2008) are 29.1% and 27.7%, respectively. The 
difference between the mean LRETR in our study and that in Dyreng et al.’s can be caused by different sample 
selection criteria. Dyreng et al. require their sample firms to have 10 consecutive years of non-missing data for #317, 
#16, and #170. Our study does not impose such restrictive requirements, requiring only three consecutive years of 
non-missing data for these items. In addition, their sample covers 1995–2004, whereas our sample period of tax 
variables covers 1994–2007. 
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proxies are as expected: SHELTER is negatively correlated with LRETR (-0.330) and positively 
correlated with BTDFACTOR (0.439), and LRETR is negatively correlated with BTDFACTOR 
(-0.245). More importantly, both measures of future crash risk are positively correlated with 
SHELTER and BTDFACTOR and negatively correlated with LRETR, which is consistent with our 
predictions that firms with high tax avoidance levels have higher future crash risk. Finally, we 
observe negative correlations between accrual earnings management (ACCM) and tax avoidance 
measures, which is inconsistent with the finding of Frank et al. (2009).26 Although this result could 
be caused by the different empirical proxies employed, another possibility is that tax avoidance and 
accrual management are substitutes in inflating earnings and hiding bad news.27 Note also that this 
negative correlation works against our predictions, since Hutton et al. find that ACCM is positively 
related to future crash risk. This is actually good news for our study, in the sense that a positive 
relation between tax avoidance and future crash risk, once observed, would be unlikely to be simply 
picking up the positive effects of ACCM on crash risk documented by Hutton et al. (2009). 
 [Insert Table 2 Here] 
4.2. Portfolio Analysis 
To obtain a preview of the relation between crash risk and tax avoidance and detect potential 
nonlinear relations, this section conducts portfolio analyses on the relation between tax avoidance 
and stock price crash risk. For this purpose, we first identify break points that sort our sample firms 
into three accrual management groups and three tax avoidance groups, based on the values of ACCM 
and one of the three tax avoidance measures in year t - 1. These two-way sorts result in a 3 × 3 grid 
of firms for each of the three tax avoidance measures. Then, for each cell of firms in each 3 × 3 grid 
                                                 
26 Blaylock et al. (2010) and Lennox et al. (2010) are also unable to replicate the positive relation between tax 
avoidance and earnings management documented by Frank et al. (2009).  
27 Note that the negative correlation between tax avoidance and accrual management is observed for all three tax 
avoidance proxies. 
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for each tax avoidance measure, we calculate the average value of crash risk in year t. We condition 
our groupings of tax avoidance on ACCM, because prior research suggests that tax avoidance and 
accrual earnings manipulation are correlated (Frank et al., 2009) and ACCM is the key variable that 
forecasts future crash risk in Hutton et al. (2009). 
Table 3 reports the results. Panel A of Table 3 shows that future crash probability increases 
monotonically as we move from groups with the least amount of tax avoidance to those with the most 
for all ACCM groups and for all measures of tax avoidance. This finding is consistent with our first 
hypothesis, that the bad news hoarding and resource diversion associated with tax avoidance 
activities increase future crash risk. In addition, the relation between tax avoidance and crash risk is 
robust to controlling for accrual earnings management, suggesting that our tax avoidance measures 
are not simply picking up the effect of accrual manipulation. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the results of using NCSKEW as the crash risk measure, which 
generally tells the same story as Panel A. Note also that both Panels A and B of Table 3, overall, 
reveal a positive relation between ACCM and crash risk across different tax avoidance groups, with a 
few exceptions, although some nonlinear relations appear in a few tax avoidance groups. This result 
is largely consistent with that reported by Hutton et al. (2009). 
In short, our results in Table 3 reveal a positive relation between tax avoidance and crash risk, 
with no obvious pattern of nonlinearity between the two, which is consistent with the prediction of 
H1. Moreover, the results also suggest that our tax avoidance measures are picking up substantially 
different aspects than those captured by earnings management in their relation to future crash risk. 
Put differently, the positive relation observed between tax avoidance and crash risk is unlikely to be 
driven by the positive impact of ACCM on crash risk. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
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4.3. Multivariate Test of H1 
Hypothesis H1 predicts that tax avoidance is positively related to future stock price crash risk, 
because it facilitates rent diversion and bad news hoarding. Table 4 presents the multivariate 
regression analyses for testing H1, with the full set of control variables. To alleviate concern about 
potential cross-sectional and time-series dependence in the data, we report t-values (z-values) on an 
adjusted basis, using robust standard errors corrected for double (firm and year) clustering (Cameron 
et al., 2009; Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009).28,29 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates for Eq. (5), using logistic regressions 
with CRASHt as the dependent variable. In Panel A, each of the three columns presents the regression 
results with each of three proxies for tax avoidance as our test variable. As shown in column 1, when 
SHELTER, that is, the predicted probability of tax sheltering computed using the Wilson (2009) 
model, is used as our test variable, the coefficient of SHELTER is highly significant with an expected 
positive sign (0.270 with t = 4.59). This significantly positive relation between the probability of 
engaging in complex tax shelters and future crash risk is consistent with H1, suggesting that complex 
tax shelters provide self-interested managers with opportunities, means, and masks to conceal 
negative information or divert company resources for extended periods, which in turn leads to an 
increase in future crash risk. 
In column 2 of Panel A of Table 4, where LRETR is used as a proxy for tax avoidance, the 
coefficient of LRETR is highly significant with an expected negative sign (-0.305 with t = -4.58), 
which is also consistent with H1. This finding suggests that firms with lower long-run effective cash 
tax rates have higher future crash risk. In other words, the likelihood of future stock price crashes is 
                                                 
28  The double-clustering programs for logistic models are obtained from Mitchell A. Petersen’s website: 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_programming.htm.See Cameron et al. (2009) 
for detailed procedures. 
29 We also include year fixed effects in the regressions. Even though we use market-adjusted (firm-specific) returns 
to construct the crash risk measures, it still seems necessary to control for year fixed effects. Table 1 shows that the 
firm-specific crash risks are significantly higher in 2001 and 2008 than in other periods. 
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significantly higher for firms with the ability to pay a low amount of cash taxes per dollar of pre-tax 
earnings over an extended period. The above result raises an alarm to the investment community 
about using effective tax rates to gauge a firm’s operating efficiency. Under the guise of lowering 
corporate taxes and saving money for investors, managers could in fact engage in opportunistic 
behaviors such as concealing bad operating performance to minimize attention and scrutiny from 
outside investors or to maximize private gains. These personal gains can take the form of receiving 
undeserved bonuses, retaining their current positions and reputations, and even hiding direct asset 
diversion or stealing. Of course, outside investors eventually bear the costs associated with such 
managerial opportunism when the stock price crashes. 
Column 3 of Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression with 
BTDFACTOR as our proxy for tax avoidance. As shown, we find that the coefficient of 
BTDFACTOR is significantly positive (0.233 with t = 3.59), which is in line with H1. Since the 
results in column 3 are similar to those reported in columns 1 and 2, for brevity, we do not repeat our 
interpretation here. 
To assess the economic significance of the results, we estimate the marginal effect of each 
tax avoidance variable on crash risk, which is the expected increase in the probability of a crash as a 
function of the given tax avoidance variable, holding all other variables at their sample mean. The 
marginal effect is 3.6% for SHELTER, -4.1% for LRETR, and 3.1% for BTDFACTOR.30 Given that 
the unconditional probability of a crash in our sample is 16.1%, these results suggest that the 
association between tax avoidance and crash risk is economically significant as well. 
The coefficients of the control variables are generally consistent with the findings of prior 
studies. First, consistent with Chen et al. (2001), we find that the coefficient of DTURN is 
significantly positive, suggesting that differences of opinion among investors increase future crash 
                                                 
30 By comparison, the marginal effects of ACCM are 3.7%, 4.4%, and 4.2%, respectively, in the models with 
SHELTER, LRETR, and BTDFACTOR as the dependent variable. 
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risk. We also find that past negative return skewness, past return, firm size, and market-to-book ratio 
are all positively related to crash risk, consistent with the findings of Chen et al. (2001). Second, 
consistent with Hutton et al. (2009), we find negative coefficients for both LEV and ROA. Finally, the 
coefficient of ACCM is significantly positive, suggesting that firms with more accrual manipulation 
as proxied by a three-year moving sum of absolute discretionary accruals are more likely to crash in 
the future. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
To obtain a clearer picture on the relation between tax avoidance and crash risk, Figure 1 
presents the predicted crash probabilities that are computed using the mean values of SHELTER 
(LRETR, BTDFACTOR) for each of the SHELTER (LRETR, BTDFACTOR) decile portfolios, with all 
other control variables set to their sample means. In so doing, we use the estimated coefficients 
reported in Panel A of Table 4. As illustrated in Panel A of Figure 1, the predicted crash risk in year t 
increases monotonically as we move from the lowest SHELTER decile to the highest, suggesting a 
positive and linear relation between tax avoidance and future crash risk. The crash likelihood of firms 
in the lowest SHELTER decile is about 4.5% higher than for firms in the highest SHELTER decile. 
Given that the unconditional crash likelihood in our sample is 16.1%, this is a meaningful difference 
that accounts for about 28% variation in crash risk. Panels B and C of Figure 1 present the predicted 
crash risk for the LRETR and BTDFACTOR decile portfolios, respectively. Again, we see that the 
relations of the predicted crash likelihood with these two proxies for tax avoidance are monotonically 
increasing, and that the relations are economically significant. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results of OLS regressions for Eq. (6), where NCSKEW is used 
as the dependent variable. As shown, firm-specific negative return skewness in year t is negatively 
related to LRETR in year t - 1 and positively related to SHELTER and BTDFACTOR in year t - 1, 
which is in line with the results reported in Panel A of Table 4. These findings lend further support to 
hypothesis H1, indicating that firms with lower cash effective tax rates, a higher likelihood of using 
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tax shelters, and larger book–tax differences are more crash prone in that their firm-specific return 
distributions are more negatively skewed. 
Overall, the results in Table 4 strongly support our hypothesis H1, that tax avoidance 
activities are positively associated with future crash risk. These results are robust to the use of three 
alternative proxies for tax avoidance and two alternative measures of crash risk. Furthermore, our 
results hold even after controlling for the accrual manipulation measure of Hutton et al. (2009), the 
investor heterogeneity of Chen et al. (2001), and other potential determinants of crash risk. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
4.4. Test of H2 
If the positive relation between tax avoidance and future crash risk is due to tax avoidance 
facilitating opportunistic managerial behaviors, such as bad news hoarding and resource diversion, 
one can expect the strength of the relation to be attenuated for firms with effective external 
monitoring, as hypothesized in H2. To test H2, we estimate Eqs. (7) and (8), in which our tax 
avoidance proxies are interacted with our proxies for external monitoring. Table 5 presents the 
estimated results, using analyst coverage and institutional shareholding as the proxies for the efficacy 
of external monitoring. 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the logistic regression results with CRASH as the dependent 
variable. As noted by Ai and Norton (2003), the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms in a 
logit regression can be biased when estimated using routine estimation methods. To address this 
concern, we estimate the coefficients and z-statistics of the interaction terms by applying the 
methodology of Norton et al. (2004).31 As shown in column 1 of Panel A of Table 5, when tax 
avoidance is proxied by SHELTER, the coefficient of the main effect variable (TAXVAR = SHELTER) 
                                                 
31 The STATA command (inteff.ado) is available at http://www.unc.edu/~enorton. Note that the coefficients generated by 
the inteff command represent marginal effects of the interaction terms. 
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is significantly positive, which is consistent with H1. We find that the coefficients of the interaction 
terms, that is, ANAL × SHELTER and INST × SHELTER, are both significant and negative, which is 
consistent with H2, that the positive association between tax avoidance and crash risk is less 
pronounced for firms with stronger external monitoring. 
As reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5, when tax avoidance is proxied by LRETR and 
BTDFACTOR, respectively, the coefficients of the main effect variables (TAXVAR = BTDFACTOR 
or SHELTER) are highly significant with an expected sign in both cases, which is again consistent 
with H1. The coefficients of both interaction terms, that is, ANAL × TAXVAR and INST × TAXVAR, 
are significant with an expected negative sign in all cases, except that INST × BTDFACTOR is not 
significant. The above results are, overall, consistent with H2. 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the regression results when crash risk is proxied by NCSKEW. 
We find that all the coefficients of both the main effect terms and the interaction effect terms are 
highly significant with expected signs in all cases, except that only in one out of six cases is the 
coefficient of the interaction term (INST ×BTDFACTOR) insignificant.  
In short, the results reported in Panels A and B of Table 5 lend strong support to H2, 
especially when tax avoidance is proxied by our two main measures, that is, SHELTER and LRETR. 
These results suggest that the positive association between tax avoidance and crash risk is attenuated 
when external monitoring is effective, which could be viewed as evidence corroborating the agency 
theory explanation for the association. 
 [Insert Table 5 Here] 
In Table 6, using a smaller sample of firms with available shareholder rights data, we 
examine the role of shareholder rights in moderating the relation between tax avoidance and crash 
risk. As shown in both Panels A and B of Table 6, we find that the coefficients of the main effect 
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terms are highly significant with expected signs across all six cases, which further corroborates the 
prediction of H1. We find, however, that only three out of six specifications load significant 
coefficients for the interactions between shareholder rights and tax avoidance, that is, HIG × 
TAXVAR, with expected signs, suggesting that the moderating role of shareholder rights in 
determining the relation between tax avoidance and crash risk is less pronounced than that played by 
analyst coverage and institutional shareholding. 
In short, the results presented in both Tables 5 and 6, taken together, are consistent with the 
agency theory explanation for tax avoidance advocated by Desai and Dharmapala (2006). Our results 
are also in line with the empirical results of Desai and Dharmapala (2009a) and Hanlon and Slemrod 
(2009), in the sense that the impact of tax avoidance on investor welfare depends on the efficacy of 
governance or external monitoring. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
5. Additional Tests and Robustness Checks 
5.1. Tax Avoidance, Earnings Management, and Crash Risk 
 One reason tax avoidance is positively related to crash risk is that it can help managers 
conceal negative information for an extended period.32  The role of tax avoidance in bad news 
hoarding can take at least two forms. First, tax avoidance activities themselves, for example, via 
transactions with special-purpose vehicles or related party transactions, can manufacture 
(unsustainable or fake) earnings or operating cash flows that offset adverse operating performance, as 
in the case of Enron, Dynegy, and others. In this sense, tax avoidance is similar in spirit to earnings 
                                                 
32 Note that tax avoidance can also be related to crash risk by facilitating managers’ engagement in more direct 
resource diversion activities (e.g., direct theft), as discussed in Sections 1 and 2, although bad news hoarding is also 
a type of rent diversion in a broader sense. 
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manipulations through restructuring real activities, as discussed in Roychowdhury (2006), even 
though tax avoidance transactions can be more opaque than real earnings management activities such 
as overproduction. Second, complex tax sheltering arrangements can decrease corporate transparency 
and provide managers with masks for earnings manipulation via discretionary accrual choices. For 
example, in the case of Tyco, the complexity of the firm’s operations (achieved by tax avoidance 
strategies) prevented investors from detecting accrual earnings manipulation. 
 In our main tests, we explicitly control for earnings manipulation to examine the direct effect 
of tax avoidance on bad news hoarding (and thus crash risk) beyond and above its indirect effect 
through facilitating accrual manipulation. In other words, we want to examine whether the bad news 
hoarding and resource diversion associated with complicated tax avoidance arrangements can 
incrementally increase crash risk, holding the firm’s earnings management level constant. However, 
the challenge is that we cannot perfectly control for earnings manipulation because of the potential 
limitations inherent in the available empirical measures of earnings manipulation. This section tries 
to at least partially address this issue by using two alternative measures of earnings management (in 
addition to Hutton et al.’s (2009) measure denoted by ACCM). Specially, we use Dechow and 
Dichev’s (2002) accrual quality measure and Dechow et al.’s (2010) F-SCORE to control for the 
effect of earnings manipulation on crash risk. 
As shown in columns 1 to 4 of Table 7, the coefficients of our test variables (TAXVAR) are 
highly significant with expected signs, indicating that our main results are robust to the inclusion of 
various proxies for earnings manipulation. The results for earnings management are generally 
consistent with those of Hutton et al. (2009). For example, we find that firms with greater accrual 
manipulation (higher ACCM), lower accrual quality (lower DD_AQ), and higher tendencies to 
manipulate earnings (higher F-SCORE) are more crash prone. In column 5 of Table 7, we regress 
crash risk on one of three proxies for tax avoidance without controlling for earnings manipulation. In 
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doing so, we want to capture the total effect (both direct and indirect) of tax avoidance, as discussed 
above. Again, we observe no significant changes in the coefficients of the tax avoidance variables. 
 Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that the “indirect” effect of tax avoidance on bad news 
hoarding (and, in turn, crash risk) through earnings management may not be the dominating force 
that drives our main empirical results. This is not surprising, because we cannot replicate Frank et 
al.’s (2009) finding on the positive association between tax avoidance and financial reporting 
aggressiveness using our sample and empirical measures. Also, we are aware of at least two other 
studies that show no significant positive relation between tax avoidance and earnings manipulation 
(Blaylock et al., 2010; Lennox et al., 2010). Thus, we argue that the relation between tax avoidance 
and earnings management is far from obvious and warrants further investigation. Finally, the results 
in this subsection also help to differentiate our study from that of Hutton et al. (2009), which shows a 
significant positive relation between earnings management and crash risk. Overall, our results in 
Table 7 suggest that tax shelters can help managers conceal bad news, even if earnings manipulation 
is absent.33 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
5.2. Longer Forecast Windows 
In our logit and OLS regressions thus far, we examine the predictive ability of our tax 
avoidance proxies with respect to future crash risk. In measuring crash risk, we consider future crash 
occurrences in the one-year-ahead forecast window. This section further examines how far out the 
three tax avoidance proxies can predict future crash risk. For this purpose, we now expand the 
measurement interval of future crash risk into two- and three-year-ahead windows. Specifically, we 
estimate CRASH and NCSKEW using firm-specific weekly returns during the two- and three-year 
                                                 
33 Note that this interpretation can be problematic because of the imperfect measures of earnings management. 
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periods, starting three months after the current fiscal year-end. In so doing, we require at least 100 
and 150 weekly returns for each firm for the two- and three-year window tests, respectively. Using 
these longer-interval crash risk measures as our dependent variable, we re-estimate all the regressions 
in Table 4 and report the new results in Table 8. 
Panel A of Table 8 displays the regression results of forecasting future crash risk in the two-
year-ahead window. As shown, all three proxies of tax avoidance are significantly and positively 
related to the longer-interval crash risk measured for the two-year-ahead window, except that the 
relation between BTDFACTOR and CRASH is positive but insignificant. As shown in Panel B of 
Table 8, when future crash risk is measured using the three-year-ahead window, we find that the 
predictive abilities of both SHELTER and LRETR remain highly significant, although that of 
BTDFACTOR becomes insignificant. These results hold, irrespective of whether future crash risk is 
measured by CRASH or NCSKEW. In short, the results presented in Table 8 lend further support to 
the predictive ability of our tax avoidance proxies with respect to future crash risk up to three years 
ahead.34 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
5.3. Hazard Model Tests 
Jin and Myers (2006) suggest that past crash history affects future crash likelihood. For 
instance, they argue that the likelihood of another crash immediately after a crash is zero. Kim and 
Zhang (2010) point out that a proportional hazard model approach is more appropriate in examining 
the determinants of crash risk, because it naturally controls for the past history of crashes. Following 
their suggestion, we test the robustness of our main results using the Cox proportional hazard model. 
                                                 
34 A limitation of longer forecast window tests is that they can suffer from the survivorship bias. For example, those 
firms that crashed in the first year could be dropped from CRSP (delisted) during the second or third year, and thus 
excluded from the two or three-year window samples. However, it is not clear how this effect can bias for or against 
our finding of a significant positive relation between crash risk and tax avoidance (although it can reduce the power 
of tests). 
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Untabulated results from the hazard model approach are generally consistent with the logistic 
regression results, except that the coefficient of the book-tax difference proxy is not always 
significant, although it carries an expected positive sign.35 It should be pointed out, however, that 
estimation of the hazard model necessarily leads to a substantial reduction in sample size, because it 
requires that only firms that experienced at least one crash event be included in the sample. In short, 
the use of the hazard model has an advantage in incorporating past crash history into the crash 
prediction, while it can reduce the power of our statistical tests because non-crash firms are excluded 
from the sample. 
5.4. Firm Fixed Effects Regressions 
Since the empirical literature on forecasting crash risk is relatively new, it is possible that our 
analysis omits from the regressions some crash determinants that are correlated with other included 
variables. To mitigate potential problems that can arise from correlated omitted variables, we re-
estimate the logit model in Table 4 using a conditional logistic regression technique that allows us to 
control for firm fixed effects (Allison, 2005). Table 9 presents the results of this exercise. As shown 
in Table 9, the relation between tax avoidance and future crash risk remains highly significant with 
an expected negative (positive) sign in column 2 (columns 1 and 3), suggesting that our results 
reported in Table 4 are unlikely to be driven by omitted correlated time-invariant variables. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
5.5. Alternative Measures of Crash Risk 
As another proxy for future crash risk, Chen et al. (2001) use the “down-to-up volatility” 
measure (DUVOL), which captures asymmetric volatilities between negative and positive firm-
specific weekly returns. We re-estimate all the regressions reported in Table 4, using DUVOL as the 
                                                 
35 The estimated results of the Cox proportional hazard model are available upon request.  
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dependent variable. Though not tabulated for brevity, the results using this alternate measure are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study documents strong evidence that tax avoidance is positively associated with the 
future crash risk of firm-specific returns. Our results are robust to the use of three alternative proxies 
for tax avoidance: a measure of the probability of tax sheltering, a long-run cash effective tax rate 
measure, and a common factor extracted from three book-tax difference measures. The results are 
also robust to the use of alternative measures of future crash risk and a variety of sensitivity checks. 
Our results are, overall, consistent with the agency perspective on tax avoidance: Tax 
avoidance activities facilitate managerial opportunistic behavior (Desai and Dharmapala 2006). 
Specifically, complex tax shelters create tools and masks for managers to manufacture earnings and 
conceal negative operating outcomes for an extended period. Accordingly, negative information and 
bad performance are likely to stockpile within the firm, until an asset price crash occurs when a 
threshold is crossed. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first systematic study to identify 
an adverse consequence of corporate tax avoidance activities in the context of stock price crashes. 
Moreover, we find that the relation between tax avoidance and crash risk is less pronounced for firms 
with effective external monitoring, a finding consistent with the agency perspective of tax avoidance. 
Our results are also consistent with the bad news hoarding theory of stock price crashes, as 
developed by Jin and Myers (2006) and Bleck and Liu (2007). In view of the recent stock market 
debacle, academic researchers, regulators, and the investment community have paid increasing 
attention to the causes and consequences of extreme negative return outcomes or crashes. Given the 
scarcity of systematic evidence on these issues, our study can be seen as a joint test that aggressive 
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and complex tax avoidance strategies facilitate managerial rent diversion and bad news hoarding, and 
that rent diversion and bad news hoarding increase future crash risk. Admittedly, however, the 
evidence on our maintained assumption that tax avoidance facilitates bad news hoarding is largely 
anecdotal (e.g., in the cases of Enron and Dynegy). We therefore recommend further research on the 
association between tax avoidance and bad news hoarding.36 
In the context of the crash risk literature, our study is distinguished from a related study by 
Hutton et al. (2009) in the following ways. First, Hutton et al. (2009) focus on accrual-based earnings 
management as an important cause of stock price crashes. It is well known, however, that accruals 
reverse over time, and thus it is unlikely that managers can conceal negative information for an 
extended period by relying only on discretionary accrual choices. In contrast, we argue that complex 
tax shelters and tax planning tools allow managers to manufacture earnings via restructuring real 
transactions, which provides a powerful means for hiding unfavorable information for an extended 
period. Second, accrual manipulation cannot create operating cash flows. Boosting earnings without 
increasing operating cash flows will attract investors’ suspicions about the quality of the firm’s 
earnings. In fact, this was a particular concern faced by Dynegy and many other energy companies in 
2000 (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). To mitigate this disconnect between earnings and cash flows, 
Dynegy turned to a tax sheltering arrangement, which created $300 million in operating cash flows 
for fiscal year 2001. In this sense, tax sheltering can be viewed as a more effective vehicle for 
concealing unfavorable information from outside stakeholders. Third, tax shelters can provide shields 
that can facilitate accrual management: Without the masks provided by tax shelters, accrual 
management could be more easily detected. 
                                                 
36 If one is convinced by prior research that crashes are caused by bad news hoarding, our empirical tests can then be 
seen as a test of the relation between tax avoidance and bad news hoarding. Note that Kothari et al. (2009) infer bad 
news hoarding from large negative market reactions to voluntary disclosures. However, we argue that our method 
may be better in detecting bad news hoarding, since not all hoarded bad news is released during a firm’s voluntary 
disclosure. 
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One potential empirical challenge of our study is that our measures of tax avoidance may be 
simply picking up the effect of earnings management. This concern is more relevant for book-tax 
difference measures. We mitigate this concern by using multiple proxies for tax avoidance, especially 
our two main measures besides book-tax differences. In addition, we explicitly control for earnings 
manipulation and show that the predictive power of tax avoidance with respect to crash risk is 
incrementally significant beyond and above that of earnings management. 
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Appendix A. Benefits of Enron’s Structured Transactions, 1995–2001 
(Millions of Dollars) 
 
Project 
Name 
Financial 
Accounting Income 
through 2001 
Total Projected 
Financial 
Accounting Income 
Federal Tax Savings 
through 2001 
Total Projected 
Federal Tax Savings 
Tanya (1995) 66 66 66 66 
Valor (1996) – 82 82 82 
Steele (1997) 65 83 39 78 
Teresa (1997) 226 257 -76 263 
Cochise (1998) 101 143 – 141 
Apache (1998) 51 167 51 167 
Tomas (1998) 37 113 95 109 
Renegade (1998) 1 1 0 0 
Condor (1999) 88 328 0 332 
Valhalla (2000) 16 64 0 0 
Tammy I (2000) – 406 0 414 
Tammy II (2001) – 369 0 370 
Totals 651 2,079 257 2,022 
 
This table partly reproduces Table 1 of the JCT report (U.S. Congress, 2003, p. 107). It summarizes certain tax and 
accounting information regarding 12 of Enron’s structured transactions. Federal tax savings are computed using a 
35% tax rate. 
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Appendix B. Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent Variables: Crash Risk Measures 
 
CRASH is an indicator variable that takes the value one for a firm–year that experiences one or more firm-
specific weekly returns falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over 
the fiscal year, with 3.2 chosen to generate frequencies of 0.1% in the normal distribution during the fiscal 
year period, and zero otherwise. 
 
The firm-specific weekly return (W) is equal to ln(1 + residual), where the residual is from the following 
expanded market model regression: 
 
τττττττ εβββββα jmjmjmjmjmjjj rrrrrr ++++++= ++−− 2,51,4,31,22,1, . 
 
NCSKEW is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period. 
 
 
Measures of Tax Avoidance 
 
SHELTER is the firm’s estimated sheltering probability, based on Wilson’s (2009) tax sheltering model: 
SHELTER = -4.86 + 5.20 × BTD + 4.08 × |DAP| - 1.41 × LEV + 0.76 × AT + 3.51 × ROE + 1.72 × 
FOREIGN INCOME + 2.43 × R&D, where BTD is defined in Appendix C; |DAP| is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals from the performance-adjusted modified cross-sectional Jones model; LEV is long-
term debt (#9) divided by total assets (#6); AT is the log of total assets (#6); ROE is pre-tax earnings 
(#170) divided by total assets; FOREIGN INCOME is an indicator variable set equal to one for firm 
observations reporting foreign income (#273), and zero otherwise; and R&D is R&D expense (#46) 
divided by lagged total assets. 
 
LRETR is the long-run cash effective tax rate, computed as the sum of income tax paid (#317) over the 
previous five years divided by the sum of a firm’s pre-tax income (#170) less special items (#17). We 
winsorize the values at zero and one. 
 
BTDFACTOR is a common factor extracted from three different book-tax difference measures: BTD, ETR 
Differential, and DD_BTD. These individual measures are defined in Appendix C. 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
DTURN is the average monthly share turnover over the current fiscal year period minus the average 
monthly share turnover over the previous fiscal year period, where monthly share turnover is calculated as 
the monthly trading volume divided by the total number of shares outstanding during the month. 
 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period. 
 
RET is the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period, times 100. 
 
SIZE is the log of the market value of equity. 
 
MB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
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LEV is total long-term debts divided by total assets. 
 
ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. 
 
ACCM is the prior three years’ moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals, where 
discretionary accruals are estimated from the modified Jones model (denoted OPAQUE in Hutton et al., 
2009). See Appendix D for more details. 
 
INST is the percentage of shares held by institutional owners, obtained from the Thomson 13F database. 
 
ANAL is the log of 1 + (number of estimates), where the number of estimates is the number of analysts 
following from I/B/E/S. 
 
HIG is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003) 
is greater than the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
DD_AQ is Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accrual quality measure. See Appendix D for more details. 
 
F-SCORE is Dechow et al.’s (2010) measure of the likelihood of accounting misstatements. See 
Appendix D for more details. 
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Appendix C. Construction of BTDFACTOR 
The BTDFACTOR is extracted using factor analysis from the following three book–tax difference 
measures. 
 
BTD  
The total book-tax difference, which equals book income less 
taxable income scaled by lagged assets (#6). Book income is pre-
tax income (#170) in year t. Taxable income is calculated by 
summing the current federal tax expense (#63) and current foreign 
tax expense (#64) and dividing by the statutory tax rate (STR) and 
then subtracting the change in NOL carryforwards (#52) in year t. 
If current the federal tax expense is missing, the total current tax 
expense is calculated by subtracting deferred taxes (#50), state 
income taxes (#173), and other income taxes (#211) from the total 
income taxes (#16) in year t.   
ETR Differential 
The ETR differential based on Frank et al. (2009), which equals (BI 
- ((CFTE + CFOR)/STR)) – (DTE / STR), scaled by lagged assets 
(#6); BI is pre-tax book income (#170); CFTE is the current federal 
tax expense (#63); and CFOR is the current foreign tax expense 
(#64).  
DD_BTD  
The Desai–Dharmapala (2006) residual book-tax difference, which 
equals the residual from the following firm fixed effects regression: 
BTi,t = β1TAi,t + μi + εi,t, where BT is the total book-tax difference 
and TA is total accruals measured using the cash flow method of 
Hribar and Collins (2002). Both variables are scaled by lagged total 
assets and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels for regression 
purposes.  
 
The table below presents the summary statistics on the three individual tax aggressive measures by 
ranking firm-years into deciles of the BTDACTOR. 
 
BTDFACTOR 
 (Decile) BTD 
ETR 
Differential DD_BTD 
-1.978 -0.998 -0.882 -0.690 
-0.177 -0.161 -0.191 -0.067 
0.050 -0.050 -0.066 -0.016 
0.123 -0.017 -0.030 0.010 
0.155 -0.002 -0.015 0.025 
0.179 0.006 -0.012 0.046 
0.207 0.018 -0.005 0.063 
0.244 0.034 -0.005 0.085 
0.315 0.064 -0.006 0.124 
0.883 0.318 -0.134 0.419 
 
 
47 
 
 
Appendix D. Procedures for Estimating ACCM, DD_AQ, and F-SCORE 
 
1. ACCM 
 
Following Hutton et al. (2009), we employ the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) to estimate 
discretionary accruals. Specifically, we first estimate the following cross-sectional regressions for each 
Fama and French 48-industry for each fiscal year from 1991 to 2008: 
 
 ,1
1
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1
11
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jt
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TATA
TACC εββα ++Δ+=
−−−−
                   D-(1) 
 
where 1−jtTA  is the total assets for firm j at the beginning of year t; jtTACC  is total accruals from firm j 
during year t, which is calculated as income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating 
activities adjusted for extraordinary items and discontinued operations; jtSALEΔ  is the change in sales 
for firm j in year t, and jtPPE  is property, plant, and equipment for firm j at the end of year t. 
 
The estimated coefficients from Eq. D-(1) are then used to compute discretionary accruals ( jtDISACC ): 
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where jtRECΔ  is the change in accounts receivable and αˆ , 1βˆ , and 2βˆ are the estimated coefficients 
from Eq. D-(1). The variable ACCM t-1 (denoted by OPAQUE in Hutton et al., 2009) is the moving sum of 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals over the last three years (years t - 1, t - 2, and t - 3). 
 
2. DD_AQ 
 
Following Dechow and Dichev (2002), we first estimate the following cross-sectional regressions for 
each industry with at least 20 observations in a given year based on the Fama and French 48-industry 
classification: 
 
                                                                D-(3)                              
 
where ACC is total accruals scaled by total assets and CFO is operating cash flow scaled by total assets.  
 
Then DD_AQ is computed as the standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the Dechow and 
Dichev model during the previous five years and multiplied by negative one. 
 
3. F-SCORE 
 
We first calculate the predicted value for model 1 of Panel A of Table 7 in Dechow et al. (2010): 
 
 
D-(4) 
 
,111
1
10 jt
jt
jt
jt
jt
jt
jt
jt TA
CFO
TA
CFO
TA
CFO
ACC εαααα ++++= +−
,029193201710
97911911518279008937
jtjtjt
jtjtjtjtjt
ISSUE.ΔROA).(-ΔCSALE.
SOFT.ΔINV.ΔREC.RSST_ACC.).(-P
×+×+×+
×+×+×+×+=
48 
 
 
where RSST_ACCjt is Richardson et al.’s (2005) measure of accruals for firm j in year t, which is the sum 
of the change in non-cash working capital, the change in net non-current operating assets, and the change 
in net financial assets, scaled by average total assets; ΔRECjt is the change in receivables for firm j in year 
t, scaled by average total assets; ΔINVjt is the change in inventory for firm j in year t, scaled by average 
total assets; SOFTjt is total assets minus property, plant, and equipment and cash for firm j in year t, 
scaled by total assets; ΔCSALEjt is the percentage change in cash sales for firm j in year t; ΔROAjt is the 
change in return on assets for firm j in year t; and ISSUEjt is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
one if the firm has issued new debt or equity during the year, and zero otherwise. 
 
The probability of misstatement is then calculated as 
)1(
Pr
jt
jt
p
p
jt e
e
+=  , 
Finally, 
F-SCORE = Pr /0.0037. 
      
49 
 
 
Table 1. Sample distribution and descriptive statistics for stock price crashes. 
This table presents the yearly distribution of observations and the descriptive statistics for annual stock price crashes. 
The sample period is from 1995 to 2008. Stock price crash is defined in Appendix B. 
 
Fiscal Year Number of Firms 
Number of Firms 
with 
Stock Price Crash 
Percentage of 
Firms with 
Stock Price Crash 
1995 6,698 864 0.129 
1996 6,942 847 0.122 
1997 7,405 948 0.128 
1998 7,436 1,331 0.179 
1999 6,888 895 0.130 
2000 6,746 1,012 0.150 
2001 6,498 1,443 0.222 
2002 6,091 993 0.163 
2003 5,709 788 0.138 
2004 5,553 944 0.170 
2005 5,503 980 0.178 
2006 5,414 812 0.150 
2007 5,228 941 0.180 
2008 5,051 1,374 0.272 
Total 87,162 14,171 0.163 
 
50 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
This table presents descriptive statistics and correlations for stock price crash risk, corporate tax avoidance, and control 
variables. The sample contains firm–years from 1995 to 2008 with non-missing values for all the control variables. The p-
values are reported under the correlation coefficients in Panel B. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std 5% 25% Median 75% 95%
Crash Risk Measures         
CRASH t 48,245 0.161 0.368 0 0 0 0 1 
NCSKEW t 48,245 -0.079 0.739 -2.242 -0.485 -0.077 0.319 1.178 
Tax Avoidance Measures         
SHELTER t-1 43,339 0.476 0.294 0.001 0.213 0.473 0.733 0.932 
LRETR t-1 38,370 0.365 0.283 0.000 0.191 0.301 0.407 1.000 
BTDFACTOR t-1 43,172 0.163 0.298 -1.257 0.122 0.185 0.254 0.503 
Control Variables         
DTURN t-1 48,245 0.006 0.074 -0.207 -0.018 0.002 0.026 0.145 
NCSKEW t-1 48,245 -0.096 0.713 -2.105 -0.499 -0.102 0.285 1.127 
SIGMA t-1 48,245 0.060 0.030 0.017 0.038 0.054 0.077 0.122 
RET t-1 48,245 -0.223 0.225 -1.070 -0.290 -0.144 -0.071 -0.027 
SIZE t-1 48,245 5.547 2.061 0.114 4.119 5.562 7.003 9.008 
MB t-1 48,245 2.761 2.469 0.425 1.277 1.977 3.258 7.829 
LEV t-1 48,245 0.202 0.182 0.000 0.026 0.174 0.331 0.542 
ROA t-1 48,245 0.019 0.135 -0.540 -0.004 0.038 0.084 0.185 
ACCM t-1 48,245 0.210 0.173 0.014 0.094 0.162 0.270 0.554 
ANAL t-1 48,214 1.217 1.041 0.000 0.000 1.099 2.079 2.944 
INST t-1 48,191 0.436 0.289 0.000 0.176 0.422 0.675 0.920 
GINDEX t-1 14,580 9.102 2.735 4.000 7.000 9.000 11.000 14.000 
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Panel B: Correlations 
 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
CRASH t A 1.000              
                
NCSKEW t B 0.585 1.000             
  (0.000)              
SHELTER t-1 C 0.059 0.203 1.000            
  (0.000) (0.000)             
LRETR t-1 D -0.033 -0.099 -0.330 1.000           
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)            
BTDFACTOR t-1 E 0.028 0.057 0.439 -0.245 1.000          
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)           
DTURN t-1 F 0.024 0.062 0.111 -0.044 0.028 1.000         
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)          
NCSKEW t-1 G 0.034 0.075 0.171 -0.083 0.035 0.028 1.000        
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
SIGMA t-1 H -0.015 -0.085 -0.414 0.288 -0.193 0.099 -0.047 1.000       
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
RET t-1 I 0.023 0.090 0.378 -0.288 0.197 -0.105 0.080 -0.968 1.000      
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
SIZE t-1 J 0.044 0.180 0.761 -0.253 0.194 0.047 0.181 -0.438 0.411 1.000     
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
MB t-1 K 0.029 0.069 0.077 0.006 -0.093 0.138 0.003 0.130 -0.128 -0.073 1.000    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.211) (0.000) (0.000) (0.460) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
LEV t-1 L -0.006 -0.004 0.011 -0.049 0.044 0.013 0.007 -0.125 0.113 0.256 -0.061 1.000   
  (0.203) (0.335) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.121) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
ROA t-1 M 0.000 0.055 0.331 -0.286 0.337 0.046 0.032 -0.311 0.314 0.322 -0.004 0.009 1.000  
  (0.935) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.392) (0.038)   
ACCM t-1 N 0.003 -0.048 -0.208 0.207 -0.153 -0.026 -0.046 0.405 -0.374 -0.315 0.173 -0.115 -0.180 1.000 
  (0.483) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
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Table 3. Portfolio analysis of stock price crash risk. 
This table presents the average stock price crash risk in various portfolios sorted by corporate tax avoidance and accrual 
manipulation. The sample contains firm–years from 1995 to 2008 with non-missing values for all the control variables in the 
price crash models. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A: CRASH 
 
 ACCM 
Tax Avoidance 1 (Lowest) 
2 
 
3 
(Highest) 
    
SHELTER    
    
1 (Least Aggressive) 0.138 0.132 0.130 
2  0.161 0.160 0.183 
3 (Most Aggressive) 0.159 0.173 0.191 
    
LRETR    
    
1 (Most Aggressive) 0.166 0.167 0.180 
2  0.153 0.160 0.191 
3 (Least Aggressive) 0.152 0.144 0.144 
    
BTDFACTOR    
    
1 (Least Aggressive) 0.158 0.143 0.151 
2  0.150 0.155 0.169 
3 (Most Aggressive) 0.163 0.167 0.171 
 
Panel B: NCSKEW 
 
 ACCM 
Tax Avoidance 1 (Lowest) 
2 
 
3 
(Highest) 
    
SHELTER    
    
1 (Least Aggressive) -0.346 -0.354 -0.322 
2  -0.059 -0.063 -0.040 
3 (Most Aggressive) 0.043 0.101 0.080 
    
LRETR    
    
1 (Most Aggressive) -0.020 -0.024 -0.036 
2  -0.028 -0.039 -0.028 
3 (Least Aggressive) -0.105 -0.162 -0.194 
    
BTDFACTOR    
    
1 (Least Aggressive) -0.092 -0.142 -0.165 
2 -0.060 -0.092 -0.109 
3 (Most Aggressive) -0.016 -0.028 -0.079 
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Table 4. The impact of tax avoidance on stock price crash risk (H1). 
This table presents the results of the impact of corporate tax aggressiveness on stock price crash risk. The sample 
contains firm–year observations from 1995 to 2008 with non-missing values for all the control variables. The z-values (t-
values) reported in parentheses in Panel A (Panel B) are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and time. Year fixed 
effects are included in all regressions. Here *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
 
Panel A. Logistic Regression of CRASH on Tax Avoidance: 
tt
th
m
q
qtt iablesControlVarqTAXVARCRASH εααα +++= −
=
− ∑ )( 1
2
110
 
 
Tax Avoidance (1) (2) (3) 
SHELTER t-1 0.270***   
 (4.59)   
LRETR t-1  -0.305***  
  (-4.58)  
BTDFACTOR t-1   0.233*** 
   (3.59) 
    
Control Variables    
DTURN t-1 0.550* 0.515* 0.542** 
 (1.91) (1.67) (1.99) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.049** 0.056** 0.053** 
 (2.03) (2.08) (2.19) 
SIGMA t-1 11.958** 12.327* 10.722* 
 (1.98) (1.82) (1.77) 
RET t-1 1.855** 1.913** 1.724** 
 (2.32) (2.09) (2.15) 
SIZE t-1 0.033** 0.045** 0.060*** 
 (2.50) (2.55) (3.67) 
MB t-1 0.026*** 0.045*** 0.033*** 
 (3.04) (3.77) (3.83) 
LEV t-1 -0.150 -0.226* -0.227* 
 (-1.16) (-1.94) (-1.73) 
ROA t-1 -0.219* -0.737*** -0.330*** 
 (-1.71) (-3.05) (-2.63) 
ACCM t-1 0.279*** 0.327*** 0.317*** 
 (3.44) (3.32) (3.66) 
Intercept -2.641*** -2.487*** -2.662*** 
 (-11.72) (-10.52) (-11.72) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No 
No. of Observations 43,339 38,370 43,172 
Pseudo-R2 0.020 0.021 0.020 
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Panel B. OLS Regression of NCSKEW on Tax Avoidance: 
tt
th
m
q
qtt iablesControlVarqTAXVARNCSKEW εααα +++= −
=
− ∑ )( 1
2
110
 
 
Tax Avoidance (1) (2) (3) 
SHELTER t-1 0.253***   
 (10.53)   
LRETR t-1    
  -0.148***  
BTDFACTOR t-1  (-7.60) 0.070*** 
   (3.60) 
    
Control Variables    
DTURN t-1 0.330*** 0.334*** 0.379*** 
 (5.05) (4.38) (6.07) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 
 (4.20) (3.91) (4.73) 
SIGMA t-1 4.399*** 3.686*** 3.274** 
 (3.34) (2.66) (2.44) 
RET t-1 0.633*** 0.568*** 0.526*** 
 (4.16) (3.42) (3.39) 
SIZE t-1 0.035*** 0.059*** 0.062*** 
 (7.88) (8.84) (9.91) 
MB t-1 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 
 (6.94) (7.79) (8.36) 
LEV t-1 -0.102*** -0.163*** -0.174*** 
 (-3.66) (-5.59) (-6.13) 
ROA t-1 -0.030 -0.134* -0.040 
 (-0.63) (-1.91) (-0.80) 
ACCM t-1 0.001 0.062*** 0.031 
 (0.07) (2.71) (1.55) 
Intercept -0.659*** -0.593*** -0.659*** 
 (-9.79) (-7.81) (-9.20) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No 
No. of Observations 43,339 38,370 43,172 
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.072 0.072 
 
 
55 
 
 
Table 5. Tax avoidance on stock price crash risk: The effects of external monitoring (H2). 
This table presents the results of the effects of institutional monitoring and analyst coverage on the association between 
corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk. The sample contains firm–years from 1995 to 2008 with non-missing 
values for all the control variables. The z-values (t-values) reported in parentheses in Panel A (Panel B) are based on standard 
errors clustered by both firm and time. In Panel A, for the interaction terms in the logistic model, the coefficients and the z-
statistics are calculated according to Norton et al. (2004). Year fixed effects are included. Here *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
 
Panel A. Logistic Regression of CRASH on Tax Avoidance 
 
Tax Avoidance Measure SHELTER  LRETR BTDFACTOR 
    
TAXVAR t-1 1.261*** -1.044*** 0.609*** 
 (8.16) (-7.61) (6.89) 
ANAL t-1 0.304*** -0.032 0.093*** 
 (3.95) (-1.07) (4.29) 
ANAL t-1 × TAXVAR t-1 -0.052*** 0.020** -0.038*** 
 (-6.25) (2.21) (-4.53) 
INST t-1 0.777*** 0.045 0.331* 
 (4.67) (0.26) (1.85) 
INST t-1 × TAXVAR t-1 -0.116*** 0.107*** 0.040 
 (-3.66) (3.06) (1.43) 
    
Control Variables:    
DTURN t-1 0.530* 0.429 0.507* 
 (1.66) (1.23) (1.64) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.051* 0.061* 0.061** 
 (1.77) (1.87) (2.22) 
SIGMA t-1 15.456** 18.091** 16.567** 
 (2.38) (2.42) (2.41) 
RET t-1 2.588*** 2.969*** 2.797*** 
 (2.98) (2.95) (3.08) 
SIZE t-1 0.045*** 0.024 0.037** 
 (2.88) (1.15) (2.34) 
MB t-1 0.034*** 0.051*** 0.034*** 
 (3.23) (3.84) (3.86) 
LEV t-1 -0.225 -0.245** -0.232* 
 (-1.54) (-2.12) (-1.74) 
ROA t-1 -0.317** -1.014*** -0.450*** 
 (-2.08) (-3.20) (-2.87) 
ACCM t-1 0.414*** 0.451*** 0.439*** 
 (4.49) (4.13) (4.63) 
Intercept -3.480*** -2.502*** -3.005*** 
 (-11.42) (-11.21) (-11.21) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No 
No. of Observations 42,934 38,098 42,865 
Pseudo-R2 0.038 0.033 0.032 
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Panel B. OLS Regression of NCSKEW on Tax Avoidance 
 
Tax Avoidance Measure SHELTER  LRETR BTDFACTOR 
    
TAXVAR t-1 0.416*** -0.271*** 0.095*** 
 (11.44) (-12.00) (5.16) 
ANAL t-1 0.131*** 0.043*** 0.072*** 
 (6.96) (5.07) (7.43) 
ANAL t-1 × TAXVAR t-1 -0.135*** 0.041*** -0.051*** 
 (-6.01) (3.03) (-3.93) 
INST t-1 0.242*** 0.075* 0.167*** 
 (4.81) (1.94) (4.71) 
INST t-1 × TAXVAR t-1 -0.212** 0.261*** 0.071 
 (-2.46) (3.79) (1.36) 
    
Control Variables    
DTURN t-1 0.331*** 0.327*** 0.370*** 
 (5.42) (4.18) (5.67) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.011* 0.015** 0.017*** 
 (1.95) (2.21) (3.03) 
SIGMA t-1 2.183* 2.043* 1.828 
 (1.88) (1.66) (1.49) 
RET t-1 0.363*** 0.368** 0.357** 
 (2.65) (2.41) (2.51) 
SIZE t-1 0.014*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (3.84) (4.72) (6.28) 
MB t-1 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 
 (5.83) (6.62) (6.94) 
LEV t-1 -0.053** -0.093*** -0.091*** 
 (-2.16) (-3.61) (-3.67) 
ROA t-1 0.038 -0.112 0.022 
 (0.81) (-1.56) (0.44) 
ACCM t-1 0.010 0.064*** 0.036* 
 (0.48) (2.63) (1.71) 
Intercept -0.665*** -0.444*** -0.572*** 
 (-11.38) (-6.48) (-8.94) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No 
No. of Observations 42,830 37,887 42,622 
Adjusted R2 0.099 0.093 0.094 
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Table 6. Tax avoidance on stock price crash risk: The effect of takeover threat (H2). 
 
This table presents the results of the effects of internal corporate governance (inversely measured by anti-takeover 
provisions) on the association between corporate tax aggressiveness and stock price crash risk. The sample contains firm–
years from 1995 to 2008 with non-missing values for all the control variables. The variable HIG is a dummy that equals 1 if 
GINDEX is above the median, and 0 otherwise. The z-values (t-values) reported in parentheses in Panel A (Panel B) are 
based on standard errors clustered by both firm and time. In Panel A, for the interaction terms, the coefficients and the z-
statistics are calculated according to Norton et al. (2004). Year fixed effects are included. Here *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A. Logistic Regression of CRASH on Tax Avoidance 
Tax Avoidance Measure SHELTER  LRETR BTDFACTOR 
    
TAXVAR t-1 2.265*** -1.599*** 1.199*** 
 (3.96) (-4.21) (2.61) 
HIG t-1 0.168 0.164** -0.039 
 (0.97) (2.24) (-0.42) 
HIG t-1 × TAXVAR t-1 -0.014 -0.066** 0.041 
 (-0.34) (-1.93) (1.12) 
ANAL t-1 0.250* -0.213*** 0.002 
 (1.89) (-4.55) (0.06) 
ANAL t-1 × TAXVAR t-1 -0.064*** 0.063*** -0.043*** 
 (-3.77) (3.96) (-2.74) 
INST t-1 2.015*** 0.423* 0.802*** 
 (4.22) (1.73) (2.93) 
INST t-1 × TAXVAR t-1 -0.207** 0.059 -0.046 
 (-2.28) (0.63) (-0.50) 
    
Control Variables    
DTURN t-1 0.088 0.206 0.111 
 (0.19) (0.41) (0.24) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.111*** 0.127*** 0.123*** 
 (4.07) (5.17) (4.29) 
SIGMA t-1 33.776*** 36.458*** 34.163*** 
 (6.59) (6.57) (6.84) 
RET t-1 5.225*** 5.812*** 5.291*** 
 (6.57) (6.77) (7.01) 
SIZE t-1 0.052 0.038 0.061** 
 (1.24) (1.23) (2.04) 
MB t-1 0.033** 0.044*** 0.034** 
 (2.30) (2.81) (2.23) 
LEV t-1 -0.556** -0.587** -0.510* 
 (-2.19) (-2.30) (-1.95) 
ROA t-1 -1.639*** -2.074*** -1.667*** 
 (-4.09) (-4.53) (-4.07) 
ACCM t-1 -0.059 -0.079 -0.069 
 (-0.24) (-0.30) (-0.29) 
Intercept -4.905*** -2.893*** -3.732*** 
 (-8.78) (-11.07) (-12.04) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No 
No. of Observations 14,412 13,840 14,406 
Pseudo-R2 0.039 0.042 0.037 
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Panel B. OLS Regression of NCSKEW on Tax Avoidance 
 
Tax Avoidance Measure SHELTER  LRETR BTDFACTOR 
    
TAXVAR t-1 0.408*** -0.122** 0.307*** 
 (5.19) (-2.09) (2.89) 
HIG t-1 -0.077** 0.060*** -0.023 
 (-2.23) (2.83) (-0.99) 
HIG t-1 × TAXVAR t-1 0.111*** -0.192*** 0.108 
 (2.94) (-4.21) (1.14) 
ANAL t-1 0.105*** 0.010 0.057*** 
 (4.05) (1.10) (5.58) 
ANAL t-1 × TAXVAR t-1 -0.108*** 0.071*** -0.097*** 
 (-3.18) (5.78) (-3.40) 
INST t-1 0.332*** 0.133*** 0.189*** 
 (3.43) (3.53) (2.97) 
INST t-1 × TAXVAR t-1 -0.296*** -0.006 -0.195 
 (-2.67) (-0.06) (-1.11) 
    
Control Variables    
DTURN t-1 0.082 0.118 0.111 
 (1.02) (1.27) (1.36) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.015** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
 (2.09) (3.02) (2.75) 
SIGMA t-1 3.396*** 3.503*** 2.774** 
 (3.67) (3.01) (2.53) 
RET t-1 0.605*** 0.643*** 0.544*** 
 (4.88) (3.68) (3.79) 
SIZE t-1 0.014* 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (1.67) (2.92) (3.34) 
MB t-1 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 
 (3.03) (3.90) (3.29) 
LEV t-1 -0.075** -0.075* -0.077** 
 (-2.42) (-1.83) (-2.01) 
ROA t-1 -0.130 -0.210*** -0.125 
 (-1.53) (-2.61) (-1.46) 
ACCM t-1 0.077 0.102 0.077 
 (1.21) (1.53) (1.22) 
Intercept -0.724*** -0.443*** -0.561*** 
 (-7.50) (-6.02) (-8.86) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No 
No. of Observations 14,309 13,743 14,293 
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.059 0.059 
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Table 7. Tax avoidance, earnings management, and stock price crash risk. 
 
This table presents the results of the impact of corporate tax avoidance and earnings management on stock price crash 
risk. The sample contains firm–years from 1995 to 2008 with non-missing values for all the control variables. The z-values 
(t-values) reported in parentheses in Panel A (Panel B) are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and time. The 
same set of control variables as in Table 4 is included, but their coefficients are not reported for conciseness. Here *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A. Logistic Regression of CRASH  
Model (1) (3) (3) (4) (5) 
SHELTER 
      
TAXVAR t-1 0.270*** 0.301*** 0.316*** 0.311*** 0.231*** 
 (4.59) (4.60) (4.24) (4.24) (3.23) 
      
Earnings Management      
ACCM t-1 0.279***   0.170  
 (3.44)   (1.39)  
DD_AQ t-1  -0.308**  -0.439**  
  (-2.06)  (-1.97)  
F-SCORE t-1   0.002 0.002  
   (1.06) (1.44)  
No. of Observations 43,339 40,227 36,169 33,349 45,263 
Pseudo-R2 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.019 
LRETR 
      
TAXVAR t-1 -0.305*** -0.327*** -0.291*** -0.299*** -0.324*** 
 (-4.58) (-4.65) (-3.69) (-3.48) (-4.94) 
      
Earnings Management      
ACCM t-1 0.327***   0.213  
 (3.32)   (1.41)  
DD_AQ t-1  -0.429**  -0.532**  
  (-2.04)  (-2.09)  
F-SCORE t-1   0.002 0.005*  
   (0.89) (1.74)  
No. of Observations 38,370 37,189 31,806 29,420 40,919 
Pseudo-R2 0.021 0.022 0.020 0.021 0.021 
BTDFACTOR 
      
TAXVAR t-1 0.233*** 0.256*** 0.236*** 0.234*** 0.250*** 
 (3.59) (4.50) (3.81) (3.41) (4.24) 
      
Earnings Management      
ACCM t-1 0.317***   0.238*  
 (3.66)   (1.83)  
DD_AQ t-1  -0.320**  -0.390*  
  (-2.29)  (-1.80)  
F-SCORE t-1   0.002 0.003**  
   (1.58) (2.33)  
No. of Observations 43,172 41,812 36,217 33,209 47,242 
Pseudo-R2 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.020 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No 
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Panel B. OLS Regression of NCSKEW 
Model (1) (3) (3) (4) (5) 
SHELTER 
      
TAXVAR t-1 0.253*** 0.255*** 0.257*** 0.273*** 0.245*** 
 (10.53) (11.00) (10.60) (10.69) (10.57) 
      
Earnings Management      
ACCM t-1 0.001   -0.052*  
 (0.07)   (-1.87)  
DD_AQ t-1  -0.043  -0.179**  
  (-0.70)  (-2.25)  
F-SCORE t-1   0.001** 0.001*  
   (2.00) (1.73)  
No. of Observations 43,339 40,227 36,169 33,349 45,263 
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.075 0.078 0.078 0.073 
LRETR 
      
TAXVAR t-1 -0.148*** -0.174*** -0.139*** -0.153*** -0.165*** 
 (-7.60) (-9.04) (-7.09) (-7.61) (-8.90) 
      
Earnings Management      
ACCM t-1 0.062***   0.003  
 (2.71)   (0.12)  
DD_AQ t-1  -0.196***  -0.289***  
  (-3.23)  (-3.22)  
F-SCORE t-1   0.001* 0.003**  
   (1.74) (2.32)  
No. of Observations 38,370 37,189 31,806 29,420 40,919 
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.073 0.076 0.077 0.071 
BTDFACTOR 
      
TAXVAR t-1 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.076*** 
 (3.60) (3.98) (3.63) (3.26) (4.24) 
      
Earnings Management      
ACCM t-1 0.031   -0.009  
 (1.55)   (-0.29)  
DD_AQ t-1  -0.033  -0.162**  
  (-0.60)  (-2.03)  
F-SCORE t-1   0.001*** 0.001**  
   (2.62) (2.10)  
No. of Observations 43,172 41,812 36,217 33,209 47,241 
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.072 0.075 0.075 0.070 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No 
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Table 8. Impact of tax avoidance on stock price crash risk: 
Longer forecasting windows. 
 
This table presents the results of the impact of corporate tax avoidance on stock price crash risk during the next two-year 
and three-year window. The sample contains firm–years from 1995 to 2008 with non-missing values for all the control 
variables. The z-values (t-values) reported in parentheses in Panel A (Panel B) are based on standard errors clustered by both 
firm and time. Year fixed effects are included. Here *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
 
Panel A: Two-Year Window 
 
Dependent Variable: CRASH [t, t+1] NCSKEW [t, t+1] 
       
Tax Avoidance       
SHELTER t-1 0.166*   0.356***   
 (1.69)   (10.40)   
LRETR t-1  -0.263***     
  (-4.18)   -0.158***  
BTDFACTOR t-1   0.060  (-5.33) 0.033* 
   (1.18)   (1.94) 
       
Control Variables       
DTURN t-1 0.472** 0.389* 0.492** 0.327*** 0.307*** 0.406*** 
 (2.06) (1.65) (2.18) (2.95) (2.70) (3.53) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.024 0.024 0.027 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.034*** 
 (1.33) (1.21) (1.55) (3.41) (2.93) (3.96) 
SIGMA t-1 13.874*** 15.955*** 13.278*** 7.864*** 7.032*** 6.529*** 
 (4.07) (4.40) (4.00) (7.63) (5.96) (6.35) 
RET t-1 1.924*** 2.217*** 1.873*** 0.949*** 0.869*** 0.833*** 
 (4.31) (4.48) (4.21) (6.93) (5.34) (6.21) 
SIZE t-1 0.038** 0.045** 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
 (2.56) (2.56) (3.43) (10.37) (15.60) (16.75) 
MB t-1 0.034*** 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.027*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 
 (4.68) (4.90) (4.92) (8.13) (9.27) (9.84) 
LEV t-1 -0.194** -0.217** -0.238*** -0.070* -0.137*** -0.166*** 
 (-1.99) (-2.29) (-2.60) (-1.82) (-3.82) (-4.63) 
ROA t-1 0.113 -0.008 0.096 0.056 0.125 0.091 
 (0.82) (-0.04) (0.70) (0.75) (1.42) (1.22) 
ACCM t-1 0.164** 0.222** 0.199*** 0.026 0.127*** 0.075*** 
 (2.27) (2.14) (2.58) (0.84) (4.28) (2.60) 
Intercept -1.691*** -1.620*** -1.701*** -0.971*** -0.953*** -0.979*** 
 (-11.39) (-10.01) (-11.52) (-21.32) (-17.59) (-21.06) 
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect No No No No No No 
No. of Observations 37,886 33,585 37,751 37,886 33,585 37,751 
Pseudo-/Adjusted R2 0.019 0.021 0.019 0.084 0.083 0.079 
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Panel B: Three-Year Window 
 
Dependent Variable: CRASH [t, t+2] NCSKEW [t, t+2] 
       
Tax Avoidance       
SHELTER t-1 0.146*   0.371***   
 (1.85)   (8.99)   
LRETR t-1  -0.168**     
  (-2.32)   -0.165***  
BTDFACTOR t-1   0.025  (-5.49) 0.020 
   (0.49)   (1.19) 
       
Control Variables       
DTURN t-1 0.557*** 0.530* 0.570*** 0.302*** 0.277** 0.387*** 
 (2.79) (1.88) (2.87) (2.96) (2.56) (3.64) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.055** 0.047** 0.058*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.049*** 
 (2.56) (1.98) (2.78) (5.11) (3.54) (5.55) 
SIGMA t-1 13.775*** 16.342*** 13.275*** 8.402*** 7.760*** 7.129*** 
 (4.16) (4.42) (4.03) (11.90) (9.39) (10.46) 
RET t-1 1.810*** 2.137*** 1.767*** 1.030*** 0.959*** 0.924*** 
 (4.55) (4.81) (4.47) (10.57) (8.61) (9.91) 
SIZE t-1 0.050*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.058*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 
 (3.37) (4.03) (4.68) (9.52) (16.01) (16.47) 
MB t-1 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
 (3.73) (3.65) (4.41) (8.23) (9.28) (10.26) 
LEV t-1 -0.151 -0.227** -0.186** -0.034 -0.104** -0.137*** 
 (-1.61) (-2.38) (-2.09) (-0.71) (-2.30) (-3.09) 
ROA t-1 0.249* 0.330** 0.265* 0.134* 0.289*** 0.185*** 
 (1.71) (1.97) (1.74) (1.92) (3.34) (2.80) 
ACCM t-1 0.042 0.105 0.053 -0.006 0.082** 0.042 
 (0.47) (1.01) (0.58) (-0.15) (2.38) (1.05) 
Intercept -1.055*** -1.089*** -1.059*** -1.019*** -1.028*** -1.030*** 
 (-8.91) (-8.12) (-8.95) (-22.86) (-19.02) (-22.15) 
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect No No No No No No 
No. of Observations 30,467 27,098 30,368 30,467 27,098 30,368 
Pseudo-/Adjusted R2 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.106 0.107 0.101 
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Table 9. Impact of tax avoidance on stock price crash risk: Controlling for firm fixed effect. 
 
This table presents the results of the impact of corporate tax avoidance on stock price crash risk, using conditional (firm 
fixed effects) logistic regressions. The sample contains firm–years from 1995 to 2008 with non-missing values for all the 
control variables. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and time. Year 
fixed effects are included. Here *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
Dependent Variable: CRASH t 
    
Tax Avoidance    
SHELTER t-1 0.625***   
 (5.76)   
LRETR t-1  -0.185**  
  (-2.17)  
BTDFACTOR t-1   0.208*** 
   (3.38) 
Control Variables    
DTURN t-1 0.947*** 1.061*** 1.022*** 
 (4.56) (4.66) (4.91) 
NCSKEW t-1 -0.256*** -0.257*** -0.255*** 
 (-12.47) (-11.75) (-12.39) 
SIGMA t-1 0.449 2.720 0.378 
 (0.16) (0.91) (0.13) 
RET t-1 0.927*** 1.205*** 0.976*** 
 (2.77) (3.27) (2.90) 
SIZE t-1 0.205*** 0.296*** 0.269*** 
 (5.45) (6.92) (7.43) 
MB t-1 0.057*** 0.078*** 0.062*** 
 (6.41) (7.65) (7.02) 
LEV t-1 -0.286* -0.559*** -0.505*** 
 (-1.70) (-3.17) (-3.10) 
ROA t-1 -0.619*** -0.883*** -0.566*** 
 (-3.76) (-4.51) (-3.41) 
ACCM t-1 0.067 0.194 0.158 
 (0.52) (1.33) (1.23) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 30,885 27,477 30,753 
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.038 0.038 
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Figure 1. Tax avoidance and crash risk. 
This figure presents the estimated crash probability in decile portfolios of tax avoidance levels. For each tax 
avoidance measure, we plot the predicted crash probability against the portfolio mean of the tax avoidance measure, 
based on the estimated coefficients from the corresponding model in Panel A of Table 4, holding all the control 
variables at their sample mean. The sample contains firm–years from 1995 to 2008 with non-missing values for all 
the control variables. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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